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I. Introduction
A. The End of Power Politics
In a lecture delivered in May, 1978, Hans Morgenthau, one of the
founders of a modem theory of power in international relations, de-
clared that power politics must be replaced as the intellectual basis for
the conduct of American foreign policy.' With nuclear weapons that
make possible the destruction of mankind, power politics has become
fatally dangerous as a basis for foreign policymaking. Ultimately it
will lead to a suicidal Third World War. According to Morgenthau,
the only alternative to this scenario is the formation of a world govern-
ment. For the immediate future, however, and as part of the process
leading to the foundation of a world government, states must actively
participate in the creation of functionally oriented international organi-
zations able to cope with primary concerns in international relations.
Through a process of gradual integration, the development of a larger
number of specialized international organizations could eventually
lead to the formation of a world government. International law must
play an important role during this transition. Here Morgenthau joined
the camp of the "functional-integrationist" school of international
political science.
Most scholars familiar with Morgenthau's work have been startled
by what appeared to be a repudiation of the principles of international
relations that he and, under his influence, the vast majority of Ameri-
can international political scientists had advocafed for the past thirty-
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five years. The utility of power politics is still proclaimed by Morgen-
thau's numerous disciples, the foremost of whom is Henry Kissinger,
2
mentor to Alexander Haig. When they proclaim the need for a "geopo-
litical" approach to foreign affairs, one premised on a "grand theory"
or "strategic design," they expound a theory of power politics. Their
conception consists of a refined Machiavellianism qualified by the real-
ity of nuclear weapons amassed by both superpowers.
A chief tenet of this "political realist" school of power politics is that
international law and organizations are "irrelevant" to conflict between
states over matters of "vital national interest." Nations survive precari-
ously in a Hobbesian state of nature where life is "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short."3 No law or justice exists, no conception of right or
wrong, no morality, only a struggle for survival in a ceaseless war that
engages every state. The pursuit of power at the expense of other states
is thus the fundamental right, the fundamental law, and the fundamen-
tal fact of international politics. Statesmen who disobey this "iron
law"4 of power politics and proclaim the need for more international
law and more international organizations invite destruction at the
hands of aggressors and facilitate the destruction of third parties. In
today's interdependent world, states cannot realistically hope to remain
neutral in an all-out confrontation between major powers. For expo-
nents of "political realism," physical survival must be the test for the
validity of man's philosophical, moral, and legal presuppositions.
From their perspective, international law is irrelevant in the conduct of
international relations and will not become relevant to international
politics in the foreseeable or even distant future.
According to this "realist" school, nothing essential has changed
since Thucydides first articulated the cardinal principles of power poli-
tics some 2500 years ago in the Melian Dialogue.5 Thucydides argued
that in situations of unequal power distribution between states at war,
considerations of justice are irrelevant, for without life itself such an
2. See Kissinger, Hans Morgenthau, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 2 & 9, 1980, at 12.
3. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962).
4. See H. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 144 (1951).
5. "For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences-either of how we
have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you be-
cause of wrong that you have done us-and make a long speech which would not be be-
lieved; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you
did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no
wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both sinceyou
know as well as we do that right, as the world goes ir only in question between equals inpower,
while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF THUCYDIDES: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 331 (Modern Library ed. 1951)
(emphasis added).
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intangible and transcendent value is meaningless. Nevertheless, one
implication of his argument is that in a non-belligerent situation, where
the possession by the major international actors of a rough equivalence
of military power creates a "balance of power," considerations of jus-
tice do and should come into play. In peacetime the balance of power
could therefore support and sustain a system of international law with
effective organizations for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Con-
versely, the use of power politics by states during peacetime will only
lead to war.
Compared with Machiavelli's The Prince,6 Thucydides' The Pelopon-
nesian War propounds a relatively moderate theory of power politics.
The differences in intensity are attributable to the authors' contradic-
tory attitudes toward the concept of the "balance of power" and the
ability of man to change historical conditions. 7 Thucydides believed
that man must resign and accommodate himself to the inevitability of
the balance of power system in order to survive. Machiavelli argued
that the prince must destroy the balance of power in order to achieve
historical glory even if he should perish in the process.
In The Prince, Machiavelli called for the destruction of the status quo
in Renaissance Italy that had assumed the form of a rough "balance of
power" between competing political units that kept the peninsula in a
condition of internecine warfare.8 He wanted to replace Italy's internal
balance of power system with what contemporary international polit-
ical scientists would call a "directive [i.e., authoritarian] hierarchical
system."9 Modern theorists of power politics understand, however, that
the probability of "total warfare" in the nuclear age forbids the pursuit
of Machiavellian power politics to the logical conclusion of world he-
gemony. Restraint is the alternative to thermonuclear war. Instead of
preaching the Machiavellian destruction of the international balance of
power, modern "realists" assert the fundamental importance of main-
taining the balance of power for the preservation of world peace. The
implementation of Machiavellianism in a government's conduct of for-
eign affairs must therefore be only within the confines and for the ex-
press purpose of "upholding" or "restoring" the balance of power
6. Stanley Hoffmann's distinction between a "moderate" and a "revolutionary" interna-
tional political system becomes relevant. Each finds its respective philosophical counterpart
in the theories of power politics propounded by Thucydides and Machiavelli. Hoffmann,
International Systems and International Law, in THE STATE OF WAR 88 (1965). See also
Boyle, The Law of Power Politics, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 901-30 [hereinafter cited as Power
Politics].
7. Boyle, Power Politics, supra note 6, at 912-13, 923-24.
8. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 217-25 (M. Musa trans. 1964).
9. M. KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 48 (1957).
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itself.10
The principal defect in modern "realist" theory is the supposition
that Machiavellianism can actually be subordinated to the preservation
of the balance of power. In fact, this handmaiden of foreign policy
decision-making will inevitably become its master. By its very nature,
Machiavellian power politics requires the employment of violence
against adversaries in order to achieve objectives. This dictate traps
governments into a cycle of force and counter-force from which the
only escape is nuclear destruction. Machiavellianism's presumed need
for states to engage in the threat and use of force creates an insoluble
set of problems for the conduct of foreign affairs in regard to both im-
mediate and long-range issues and general international conditions
confronting foreign policymakers.
From a long-term perspective, power politics tends to undermine the
balance of power system. It demands the constant threat and use of
force by states in their mutual relations. As a theory of international
affairs, power politics prescribes the purposeful institution of hostilities
between major actors, and even a systemic war itself, in order to "up-
hold" or "restore" the balance of power." Machiavellian power poli-
tics and war are essentially inseparable. The theory is merely a
philosophical justification and a psychological rationalization for a for-
eign policy based on permanent and universal war of aggression.
12
Of course modern theorists of power reject the inevitability of war.
They postulate the existence of some sort of "invisible hand" that will
miraculously maintain the balance of power system by ensuring that
recourse to violence will somehow fall short of global war. The as-
sumption that rational self-interest will ultimately prevail naively relies
on the alleged ability of governments to control their international
political environment and the use of nuclear weapons. Today's foreign
policymakers must comprehend the Thucydidean impersonal forces of
history that limit man's ability to determine his own fate. Otherwise
humankind will succumb to a combination of its technological perfec-
tions and Machiavellian predilections.
In the short-term perspective, Machiavellian power politics offers no
substantive prescriptions for the conduct of foreign affairs. Despite its
claim to be a "grand theory" of international relations, power politics
merely recommends adhoc calculations of national interest and power
aggrandizement at the expense of other states in order to win the sup-
10. See Boyle, Power Politics, supra note 6, at 956-66.
I1. See M. KAPLAN, supra note 9, at 22-36 (six rules for the balance of power system).
12. See Boyle, Power Politics, supra note 6, at 928-29.
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posed "zero sum game"'13 of international relations. Power politics pro-
vides no indication of how these decisions should be integrated into a
unified, coherent, and consistent policy, except for the vacuous injunc-
tion that the "balance" must be "preserved" at all costs. Power politics
is vague and insubstantial, and must therefore be rejected as a theory
for the conduct of foreign policy. Yet the reality of power must never
be ignored in the formulation of a constructive alternative.
B. The Alternative of International Law
One alternative to power politics can be found in the principles of
internati6nal law. For the purposes of this analysis, law must not sim-
ply be interpreted in the Hobbesian positivist sense as the making,
breaking, and enforcement of rules.14 A system of international law is
more properly understood as creating a framework of rules that permits
and enhances the quality of interaction among its participants.15 Ana-
lyzed in accordance with the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, the
principles of international law possess an intrinsic core of rationality
that creates a workable path between human nature and social conven-
tion critical to continued survival. 16 International law articulates rules
that actors in the international system have found to be indispensable
for international life. What is essential to international life becomes
enshrined in the rules of international law. Therefore, the require-
ments of international law should substantially, albeit imperfectly, co-
incide with the dictates of vital national interests, and vice versa. Even
in times of severe international crises, adherence to the rules of interna-
tional law is usually in a state's best interest. States ordinarily do not
adopt useless, impractical, or dangerous rules to regulate their rela-
tions. The principles of international law are created by states for the
express purpose of serving and advancing their respective national
interests.
These considerations apply especially to the conduct of American
foreign policy. Adherence to the rules of international law is consistent
with the national security interests of the United States, whether con-
sidered expansively in terms of furthering world public order or paro-
13. In a zero sum game, any player's gains are exactly balanced by the losses of others. 6
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 62-69 (1968).
14. See Boyle, Power Politics, supra note 6, at 931-49.
15. See generally L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978); Fuller, Law as an Instrument of
Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89.
16. See THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE, Book V, at 106-36 (W. Ross trans.
1954) [hereinafter cited as ARISTOTLE].
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chially in terms of satisfying selfish goals. The classic Machiavellian
dichotomy between the "is" and the "ought to be" does not hold true
for American foreign policy.17 The expedient and the just coincide and
reinforce each other. This situation exists because the United States is
the outstanding example of a status quo power. Consequently, Ameri-
can national interests include respect for international law by the
United States and other governments. Such conformity encourages the
peaceful preservation of the political, economic, and military status quo
heavily weighted to America's advantage. Phenomenologically, law is
the instrumentpar excellence for the peaceful preservation and trans-
formation of any political or economic status quo. By its very nature,
the international legal order represents an attempt by advantaged inter-
national actors to legitimate and consolidate existing and proposed
power relations. To the degree a state enjoys the benefits of the existing
configuration of international relations, the greater should be its com-
mitment to upholding international law and the creation of effective
organizations for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
For example, in time of international crisis, the government of a sta-
tus quo state such as the United States should not rely on international
legal principles such as retaliation, retorsion, reprisal, military inter-
vention, counter-intervention, humanitarian intervention, self-help, etc.
These principles of customary international law are relics of nineteenth
century "gunboat diplomacy" used by the world's imperial powers
against militarily inferior international actors and coveted colonial ter-
ritories. They are now almost universally discredited.' 8 Nevertheless,
in the late twentieth century, the great powers stubbornly insist on the
validity of some of these principles. Yet, because of the fundamental
transformation in the nature of the international system that has oc-
curred since the mid-nineteenth century, these status quo states should
be working most assiduously for the complete extinction of such retro-
gressive principles from the recognized corpus of public international
law and the established patterns of international behavior. When ma-
jor status quo powers threaten or use force for reasons not explicitly
sanctioned by contemporary standards of international law, formally
accepted by all states in the world community, they undermine the in-
tegrity of the very international legal order that they constructed to
protect their vital national interests. Consequently, those states that
currently benefit the most from the existing arrangement of interna-
17. N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 8, at 127.
18. Judgment in the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4,
34-35.
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tional relations should not unwittingly lose them by resorting to, or en-
couraging, illegitimate violence and coercion.
In contemporary international relations, the only legitimate justifica-
tions and procedures for the use of violence and coercion by one state
against another are those set forth in the United Nations Charter. The
Charter alone contains those rules that represent the almost unanimous
view of the international community. Therefore, in times of interna-
tional crisis, a major status quo power such as the United States must in
good faith use transnational force in strict accordance with the condi-
tions prescribed by the United Nations Charter. These include the
right of individual and collective self-defense as defined by Article 51;
Chapter 7 "enforcement action" by the U.N. Security Council; Chapter
8 "enforcement action" by the appropriate regional organizations act-
ing with the authorization of the Security Council as required by Arti-
cle 53; and the so-called "peacekeeping operations" organized under
the jurisdiction of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter 6, or under
the auspices of the U.N. General Assembly in accordance with the
Uniting for Peace Resolution,' 9 or by the relevant regional organiza-
tions in conformity with their proper constitutional procedures and
subject to the overall supervision of the U.N. Security Council as speci-
fied in Chapter 8 and Articles 24 and 25.
For a leading status quo power such as the United States to threaten
or use force on the basis of alleged justifications derived from antiquat-
ed and oppressive principles of customary international law is danger-
ous. The customs derive from practices of a colonialist era of
international relations. Adherence to them generates political, eco-
nomic, and military opposition from both the intended victim and all
those states that share a history of repeated victimization under the
guise of what might be called an international law of imperialistic in-
tervention, occupation, and exploitation. Such a neo-imperialist policy
by the United States may cause political isolation, and the opposition
of allied status quo states sympathizing with such victims. American
allies may have realized the need to eliminate the last vestiges of their
own imperial behavior from the contemporary system of international
relations. It therefore lies within the vital national interest of a leading
status quo power such as the United States to adopt and adhere to a
well nigh irrebutable presumption against any threat or use of force
that does not squarely fit within the few justifications and procedures
for transnational violence and coercion set forth in the United Nations
19. G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
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Charter. Thus, rather than relying on doctrinal relics of the colonial
past, or inventing novel international legal artifices such as Kennedy's
"quarantine" of Cuba, American foreign policymakers must restore the
Charter as the fundamental premise for both the management of inter-
national crises and the overall conduct of international affairs.
C. The Asymmetries of International Law and Politics
America's continued invocation of outmoded and dangerous princi-
ples of customary international law purporting to justify the interna-
tional use of force and coercion demonstrates a subliminal attachment
to legal propositions that may facilitate routine international relations.
Two such propositions prove especially dangerous in the management
of crises: (1) the rules of international law should operate symmetri-
cally for equal and independent sovereign states in their mutual rela-
tions; (2) the normal condition of strict reciprocity in legal obligations
between equal and independent sovereign states generally counsels
derogation from a fundamental norm of international law by the gov-
ernment of one state in the event of a prior violation directly affecting it
by another sovereign. Admittedly, it is an elementary principle of in-
ternational law that all states must be treated as equal and independ-
ent. Though this precept departs from the political, military, and
economic inequalities of international life, recognition of the sovereign
equality of states is essential to the preservation of world peace. It im-
pedes the strong from preying on the weak and thus forestalls a cata-
clysmic struggle among the strong over the division and conquest of the
weak.
Nevertheless, although all states are equal under international law,
they do not at all benefit equally from the rules of international law.
The major status quo powers obtain comparatively greater benefits
from the current international legal order because, in the aftermath of
the Second World War, they possessed the political, military, and eco-
nomic power requisite to promulgate and impose rules designed to op-
erate to their advantage. Thus, the international legal order is an
inherently asymmetrical system. It functions to the proportionate ad-
vantage of states to the degree they benefit from the existing political,
military, and economic status quo.
A violation of an international legal rule by a minor state against a
leading status quo power should not be treated by the latter as a suffi-
cient condition for the use of transnational violence and coercion (e.g.,
retaliation, retorsion, reprisal, intervention, self-help, etc.) in order to
protect, assert, or enforce its alleged rights. If the victim of the viola-
110
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tion enjoys a greater relative advantage than the violator in the mainte-
nance of the international legal order, the government of the victim
state must consider the long-term detrimental effects that its arguably
unjustifiable response will inflict on the stability of the international
system. As a general proposition, I submit that the damage to both its
own national security interests and to the international legal, political,
and economic status quo resulting from a counterviolation of interna-
tional law by a leading status quo power almost invariably far out-
weighs any harm to either that might arise from the original violation
of international law by a minor state together with the supposed harm
that might occur from the victim's not unilaterally prosecuting its rights
through transnational violence and coercion. In this sense, then, a
leading status quo power would be wise to follow Socrates' advice that
it is better to suffer injustice than it is to inflict injustice20 in the event of
an offense perpetrated against it by a minor state. This conclusion rec-
ommends that major status quo states rely exclusively on the rules,
techniques, and institutions afforded by the contemporary international
legal order for the peaceful settlement of disputes with minor states.
This recommendation is further strengthened by the observation that
the international legal order simultaneously consists of elements and
processes of both distributive justice and "rectificatory" justice as de-
fined by Aristotle.21 It is unfair, hypocritical, and ultimately self-de-
feating for a major status quo state in conflict with a minor adversary to
insist on its alleged right to "rectificatory" justice by means of retalia-
tion, retorsion, reprisal, intervention, or self-help when the distributive
elements and processes of the international system are already over-
whelmingly apportioned and operating to the former's distinct advan-
tage. In a system of unequally distributed power, it becomes foolish for
policymakers in a major status quo state to insist on fulfilling the prin-
ciples of "rectificatory" justice in regard to their country, while at the
same time they ignore the claims of a distributive (and rectificatory)
nature advanced by a minor adversary. As will be demonstrated be-
low, exclusive reliance on a "rectificatory" approach to international
law and organizations by the United States government throughout the
Iranian hostage crisis produced a series of disasters for American for-
eign policy, undermined the integrity of the international legal order,
and set back the cause of world peace.
Of course this line of analysis should not lead a major status quo
20. PLATO, GORGIAS 53 (Penguin ed. 1960).
21. See ARuSTOTLE, supra note 16.
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power such as the United States to tolerate behavior violative of ele-
mentary norms of international law directed against it or any other
state by another major power such as the Soviet Union. Such funda-
mentally disruptive conduct by a major actor must be resisted by all
states acting in accordance with the rules, institutions, and techniques
of the international legal order. If used intelligently this integrated col-
lection of remedies should prove sufficiently flexible and effective to
accomplish the task of defeating threats to international peace and se-
curity. It would be a serious mistake, however, for a leading status quo
state such as the United States to respond to an alleged Machiavellian
assault on the status quo by an adversary such as the Soviet Union
through the counter-practice of Machiavellian power politics either
against the latter or against some minor third state aligned with it (e.g.,
Cuba). The United States has a far greater stake than either the Soviet
Union or any of its allies in maintaining the integrity of the interna-
tional legal order to preserve a status quo still substantially weighted to
America's favor. So long as there persists a rough equivalence of mili-
tary power between the two nuclear superpowers and their respective
alliance systems, the counter-practice of power politics by the United
States and allied major status quo states weakens and may eventually
destroy the effectiveness of the entire system of international law and
organizations that they established after the Second World War for the
express purpose of preserving a favorable status quo. The use by lead-
ing status quo powers of Machiavellian power politics will either elimi-
nate or substantially decrease the advantages afforded to them by
reliance on the strength of the contemporary international legal order.
Even Machiavelli observed that the two principal foundations of all
states must consist of good laws and good armed forces.22 For the sta-
tus quo state today, the wisdom of the fox is just as important as the
strength of the lion.23
It is beyond the scope of this essay to elaborate a comprehensive
manner in which American policymakers can use international law and
organizations to conduct foreign affairs on a day-to-day basis. One
useful step, however, would be to apply the foregoing considerations to
analysis of the crises over Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, and the SALT II
Treaty that marked the latter half of President Carter's administration.
This examination will illustrate several "points of choice" 24 where a
greater degree of sensitivity to the requirements of international law
22. N. MACHIAVELLI, spra note 8, at 99. See also id at 145 (fighting by means of law).
23. Cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 16, at 145-49.
24. See generally R. FISHER, PoINTS oF CHOICE (1978).
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and a more heightened awareness of the potential of international or-
ganizations for the peaceful settlement of disputes either could have
avoided these crises or could have substantially contributed to their
more effective management and successful termination.
Many legal and political analysts have drawn the wrong "lessons"
from these crises for the conduct of American foreign policy by the
Reagan administration. In foreign affairs, President Carter certainly
did not manifest the wisdom of the fox, and Machiavelli might have
classified him in that third category of princes who are "useless" be-
cause they neither understand things on their own nor perceive what
their advisers understand.2 5 Yet the Reagan administration has im-
properly concluded that the antidote to the shortcomings of the previ-
ous administration is exclusive reliance on display of the lion's strength
in international relations. If this viewpoint prevails, a different but no
less dangerous set of international crises seems destined to afflict
United States foreign policy. Like the Iranian crisis, they will probably
be products of American, not foreign, manufacture. Conversely, if cor-
rect "lessons" from these previous crises are drawn, they can provide a
workable guide for sorting out the current disarray in foreign affairs
that has plagued the Reagan administration. This essay will develop
an analytical framework for these crises on the basis of international
law that eschews the intellectual defects of both administrations.
Though the principles of international law cannot serve as a panacea
for all the problems of international relations, they indicate one way
out of the morass of Machiavellian power politics that has engulfed
American foreign policymaking for over a generation.
II. The Definitional Context of the Iranian Crisis26
The Iranian hostage crisis did not begin with the seizure of the
United States diplomats in Teheran on November 4, 1979. Instead, it
was precipitated by President Carter's decision to admit the deposed
Shah of Iran into the United States for medical treatment readily avail.-
able elsewhere,27 contrary to the views of his advisers and intelligence
25. See N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 8, at 195.
26. For an explanation of the deinitional role of international law and organizations for
the purpose of crisis management decision-making see Boyle, International Law in Time of
Crisis: From the Entebbe Raid to the Hostages Convention, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 769, 778-86
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Entebbe].
27. See Bloom, The Pahlavi Problenr .4 Sufperficial Diagnosis Brought the Shah into the
United States, 207 SCIENCE 282 (1980); N.Y. Times, May 13, 1981, at I, col 2. See also N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1981, at B1O, col. 1; id, Mar. 21, 1980, at 26, col. 1; id, May 26, 1981, at C2,
col. 5.
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services.28 The President was fully aware that seizure of the Embassy
and the detention of its personnel would be a likely result.29 His expla-
nation that he had relied on Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's
prior assurance of protection for the Embassy is unconvincing. It was
obvious that Bazargan exerted little control over the Iranian govern-
ment, then under the domination of the Revolutionary Council led by
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, let alone over the various revolutionary
factions in Teheran. Bazargan was a figurehead and his government
powerless in light of Khomeini's prominence. Indeed, on February 14,
1979, the U.S. Embassy in Teheran had been seized by elements of the
Communist Tudeh Party and of the People's Fedayeen. After a three
hour melee, the seizure ended with the arrival of forces loyal to
Khomeini requested by Ambassador William Sullivan.30 President
Carter should never have expected a similar fortunate outcome when,
some eight months later, he decided to admit the Shah into the United
States.
From this perspective, the public debate concerning the means
whereby this country should deter future instances of "international
terrorism" is misdirected. No amount of deterrence can prevent a se-
vere crisis in relations with another country when the President of the
United States willfully provokes the crisis. The most effective deterrent
to future hostage-taking crises like Iran lies in decisive American elec-
toral results such as the overwhelming rejection of President Carter by
the American people on November 4, 1980. The Reagan administra-
tion's announced intention to replace President Carter's emphasis on
"human rights" with a war against "international terrorism" (e.g., re-
newed military and economic assistance for the repressive regimes in
Argentina, Guatemala, and Chile, or "destabilization" of Colonel Qad-
dafi in Libya) as the keystone of its foreign policy must therefore be re-
examined and repudiated.
"Terrorism" is a vacuous and amorphous concept lacking an ac-
cepted international legal meaning, let alone an objective political
referent. The standard cich6 that one man's "terrorist" is another
man's "freedom fighter" is not just a clever obfuscation of values. It
indicates that the international community has yet to agree on a legal
or political definition of "terrorism."'3' This pejorative and inflam-
28. See N.Y. Times, July 21, 1979, at 23, col. 4; Id, Nov. 18, 1979, at Al, col. 4; Id, Jan.
21, 1981, at A6, col. 1.
29. See id, Nov. 18, 1979, at Al, col. 4.
30. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1979, at A10, col. 2.
31. For example, the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism could not
agree on a definition of "terrorism." Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International
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matory term has been used to characterize acts of violence ranging
from common crime to wars of national liberation legitimized by ap-
propriate international organizations. Invoking a war against "interna-
tional terrorism" may constitute effective governmental propaganda to
manipulate public opinion in support of a foreign policy based on other
considerations such as Machiavellian power politics. 32 It cannot serve
as a basis for a coherent and consistent global foreign policy.
A. The Myth of Intelligence Failure
Blaming events in Southwest Asia on alleged U.S. intelligence fail-
ures is likewise misconceived. Despite President Carter's criticism of
C.I.A. Director Stansfield Turner,33 there never really was a failure by
U.S. intelligence agencies to predict the ouster of the Shah.3 4 The
Carter administration created the fiction of "intelligence failure" in or-
der to avoid assuming political responsibility for failing to act more
vigorously to prevent the Shah's dowifall. That decision could and
should have been publicly defended on its merits alone without resort
to such a subterfuge. Consequently, there is no need to "unleash" the
C.I.A.35 from those restrictions on its operations drawn up following
the revelation of a gross pattern of foreign and domestic abuses by the
Rockefeller Commission Report36 and the Church Committee
investigations.3
7
Terrorism, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 37) at 1, 11, para. 34, U.N. Doe. A/34/37 (1979).
Nevertheless, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the recommendations of the
4dHoc Committee on International Terrorism in G.A. Res. 34/145 (1980), 34 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 37) at 1, U.N. Doe. A/RES/34/145 (1980). Reasons for the inconclusive result
of the U.N. 4dHoc Committee on International Terrorism are explained in Boyle, Entebbe,
supra note 26, at 826-28.
32. See, e.g., Terrorism: Dubious Evidence, ECONOMIST, May 9, 1981, at 28 (C.I.A.'s
redefinition of "terrorism"); C.L4., ECONOMIST, July 4, 1981, at 26; N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,
1981, at 9, col. 1.
33. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1978, at Al, col. 4.
34. See Ledeen & Lewis, Carter and the Fall of the Shah: The Inside Story, WASH. Q.,
Spring, 1980, at 3. Cf. Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1979, at 40, col. 1 (Israel's Mossad anticipated fall
of Shah since 1977).
35. See N.Y. Times,.Mar. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 1; id, Aug. 25, 1981, at A16, col. 3; id., Oct.
6, 1981, at 1, coL 1.
36. See, e.g., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON C.I.A. ACTIVITIES
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 101 (illegal mail intercepts), 130 (Operation CHAOS), 152
(infiltration of domestic organizations), 172 (Watergate abuses), 226 (drug-testing) (June,
1975).
37. 1-6 FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 94-755, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976). See, e.g., I id at 141 (covert action), 189-203 (use of academic institutions,
media, religious groups), 385 (covert drug testing); 2 id at 10-13 (covert action and illegal or
improper means).
The myth of "intelligence failure" should not be allowed to serve as a pretext for the
imposition of additional obstacles in the way of private citizens or the press to investigate
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The claim of intelligence failure must not be allowed to justify the
renaissance of covert interventions abroad (e.g., abrogation of the
Clark Amendment 38 prohibiting covert intervention in Angola) under-
taken in express violation of international law.39 Such activities not
only work to the detriment of the international legal rights and human
dignity of alien peoples, but undermine the civil liberties of American
citizens at home and abroad.40 They subvert the foundations of Ameri-
can constitutional government. From this perspective, the new Execu-
tive Order on United States Intelligence Activities signed by President
Reagan on December 4, 1981,41 which revoked President Carter's Ex-
ecutive Order 12036 on the same subject,4 2 represents an unfortunate
retrograde step. Because of its susceptibility to abuse, the President's
discretionary control over the Central Intelligence Agency should
finally be codified by congressional enactment of a formal legislative
charter for all U.S. intelligence agencies. 43
and expose C.I.A. malfeasance (e.g., the C.I.A.'s complete exemption from the Freedom of
Information Act, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1981, at B12, col. 1, or the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421 (1982)), or to free the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. to engage
in practices of dubious constitutionality within the United States on the grounds that they
allegedly concern foreign intelligence activites or the war against "international terrorism."
38. Clark Amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Con-
trol Act of 1976, P.L. No. 94-329 (1976), 90 Stat. 729, 757 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2293
(1976)), as mod#Fed in International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980,
P.L. 96-533, 94 Stat. 3131, 3141.
39. See, e.g., Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966); Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
40. In this regard, another unfortunate consequence of the Iranian hostage crisis was the
decision of the Supreme Court in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), upholding the authority
of the Secretary of State to revoke Agee's passport, thus establishing precedent for the execu-
tive branch further to infringe on the constitutional right of U.S. citizens to engage in inter-
national travel. See Farber, National Security, the Right to Travel, and the Court, 1981 Sup.
CT. REV. 263.
41. See Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (1981).
42. See Exec. Order No. 12036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3673 (1978). See also Note, The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance, 78
MICH. L. Rav. 1116 (1980).
43. Similar criticism applies to President Carter's decision to expel from the country
those Iranian students found to be in violation of their visa requirements. See Requirements
for Maintenance of Status for Nonimmigrant Students from Iran, 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980).
Unfortunately, the President seems to possess the appropriate combination of statutory and
constitutional authorization necessary to effectuate this unfair and discriminatory policy on
his own accord. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957
(1980). This decision aimed to satisfy American public insistence that the government do
something to express outrage at the injustices perpetrated in Teheran by the students' co-
horts. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1979, at A12, col. 2; id, Nov. 10, 1979, at A6, col. 4. Attempts to
justify President Carter's decision by arguing that deportation created a safety valve for the
relief of public pressure to use military force against Iran should fail. The Carter adminis-
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B. U.S. Intervention Abroad
Because the promise of a congressional investigation of the Iranian
hostage crisis remains unfulfilled, all the facts surrounding President
Carter's decision to admit the Shah into the United States are not yet
public. The official explanation was that somehow "we owed it to him"
because he had proved himself a valued and faithful ally.44 This ra-
tionale ignored a consistent pattern of gross violations by the Shah's
secret police organization (SAVAK) 45 of those fundamental human
rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.46 On
the level of national interest, President Carter's rationale overlooked
the Shah's role as a proponent of higher oil prices within the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Enormous oil reve-
nues enabled the Shah to construct a military establishment far beyond
Iran's legitimate security needs. This was accomplished in part for the
purpose of intimidating Persian Gulf countries through threats of force,
covert intervention, and outright aggression,47 all in violation of Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter.48 In this endeavor the Shah was encouraged
by the Nixon Doctrine,49 whereby regional surrogates were intended to
help the United States "police" its spheres of influence throughout the
world. The Shah was to be America's "policeman" in the Persian Gulf.
tration allowed, if it did not encourage, American public opinion to work itself into a furor
over the incident. As a matter of sound constitutional policy the United States government
should never carry out a large-scale deprivation of civil liberties in the belief that this will
permit the achievement of foreign policy objectives. In the case of the Iranian students,
vicarious retribution inflicted upon a selected group of innocent aliens undermined the exer-
cise of civil liberties by all Americans. Especially in times of international crises, the exer-
cise of civil liberties by citizens and aliens alike is essential to restrain governmental
misconduct. Legislation should be enacted prohibiting the President from selecting out a
group of aliens peacefully residing in this country for purposes of political persecution or
manipulation. Just as the United States has come to regret the internment of Japanese-
Americans during the Second World War, we may hope for eventual repentance of this
action.
44. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1981, at A6, col. 1.
45. See Falk, Iran After the Shah: Balance Sheet on Revolution, 232 NATION 39 (1981);
N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1978, § 1, at 3, col. 4. The C.I.A. collaborated with SAVAK. See P.
SALINdER, AMERICA HELD HOSTAGE 116-17 (1981); Kaplan & Halliday, The Savak-C.LA.
Connection, 230 NATION 229 (1980).
46. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, 71 (1948). The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights was affirmed, ironically enough, in the 1968 Proclamation of Teheran. See
Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, at
3 (1968).
47. See, e.g., A. SAIKAL, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SHAH 154-61, 178 (1980) (take-
over of Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tumbs).
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.")
49. R. NIXON, THE MEMoIRs OF RICHARD NIXON 394-97 (1978).
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The "indebtedness" argument was especially puzzling. The Presi-
dent had decided not to intervene to buttress the Shah against the do-
mestic revolution that led to his downfall in January, 1979. That
decision was correct, despite its domestic unpopularity, because it com-
ported with the general principle of international law prohibiting for-
eign intervention in the domestic affairs of another state.50 The Iranian
people possessed the exclusive right to determine how their government
should be constituted without overt or covert interference by the
United States. This elementary principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples 51 took precedence over any U.S. national security
interest in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. Indeed, it was the long
history of American support of the Shah that paved the way for the
Iranian revolution in the first place. By contrast, the decision not to
intervene overtly in Iran during the events of 1978-1979 may have
averted greater catastrophes. The United States must learn from this
tragic experience that it is both just and expedient not to assist a repres-
sive regime to conduct an all-oiat struggle against its own people. Here
the basic rule of international law dictating non-intervention in the do-
mestic affairs of another country tells the United States what is in its
best interest anyway.
The appropriate lesson to be derived from the Iranian episode for
application to U.S. "friends" around the world (e.g., El Salvador, Gua-
temala, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, South Korea, South Africa) is
that the American government should refrain from intervention in the
domestic affairs of another state in order to prop up a regime that has
forfeited the support of its own people. On the other hand, the United
States must make clear that it is prepared to assist another state, at its
request, in case of aggression by a third state, in accordance with the
terms of the right of collective self-defense defined in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter.52 Yet, because it was tied down by the self-
generated Iranian hostage crisis, the United States was unable to fore-
stall the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, a blatant
50. See supra note 39. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
51. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
52. U.N. CHARTER art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
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case of aggression. This same rule would counsel provision of military
assistance by the United States government to the people of Afghani-
stan in their struggle against the Soviet invasion.5 3 Such help would
vindicate Article 51 and could facilitate a negotiated settlement of the
dispute under the auspices of the United Nations by convincing the
Soviets that they cannot win the war in Afghanistan at acceptable cost.
C. The Case for Iran
In light of this historical background, the hypothetical legal argu-
ments in defense of the Iranian seizure and detention of the American
diplomatic personnel in Teheran certainly deserve serious considera-
tion. The decision to admit the Shah demonstrated insensitivity by the
Carter administration to the concerns and fears of the Iranian people.
Once before they had ousted the Shah, only to see him restored with
the assistance of the C.I.A.54 With the Shah actually in the United
States, it reasonably appeared to them that a repetition of this scenario
was possible. Indeed, on the eve of the Shah's departure from Iran,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, had
asked the U.S. Ambassador in Teheran about the feasibility of a coup
by the Iranian military to prevent Ayatollah Khomeini from coming to
power.5 5 Presumably his request was made with the full knowledge
and approval of President Carter. The mission of General Huyser to
Teheran has been reported to have been part of the same unsuccessful
plan.56 It is undeniable that the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was engaged
in extensive intelligence activities, that U.S. intelligence agents were
stationed there under cover as diplomatic personnel,57 and that the Em-
bassy served as a primary source for channelling intelligence informa-
tion back to the United States. The Iranian apprehension of an
American-sponsored coup d'etat was undoubtedly reasonable and
sincere.
In light of these facts a plausible argument could be made that the
seizure and detention of the American diplomats was a legitimate exer-
53. See Bernstein, Arms for Afghanistan, NEw REPUBLIC, July 18, 1981, at 8-10.
54. See generally K. ROOSEVELT, COUNTERCOUP (1979).
55. Sullivan, Dateline Iran: The Road Not Taken, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Fall, 1980, at 175,
186.
56. Id, at 183; N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1980, at 1, col. 3. See also Wash. Post, Aug. 26,
1981, at B18, col. 3 (C.I.A. clandestine operation to bring down Khomeini).
57. D. McMANUs, FREE AT LAST 241 (1980); P. SALINGER, supra note 45, at 237; N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1979, at A18, col. 1; id, Jan. 21, 1981, at A6, col. 1. Seegeneraly Bassiouni,
Protection of D.plomats under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 609 (1980); Perera, On Dq0lo-
matic Immunity, MIDDLE EAST, July, 1980, at 15. See also Mottahedeh, Iran's Foreign Dev-
ils, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring, 1980, at 19.
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cise of Iran's right of individual self-defense under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, which, under the circumstances, took precedence over
Iran's obligations under Charter Articles 2(3),:8 2(4), and 3359 as well as
over the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 60 and the
1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,61 inter ala. The
seizure arguably fits the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense enunci-
ated by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the famous case of
The Caroline. This test requires "the necessity of that self-defense [to
be] instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no mo-
ment for deliberation. ' 62 From this perspective the diplomats were
seized and detained to forestall another coup d'ltat sponsored by the
United States government acting in explicit violation of international
law. 63
Accordingly, the demand by the Iranian government for the extradi-
tion of the Shah in return for the release of the hostages was justifiable.
From Teheran's perspective, there was no other effective recourse to
defend Iran from a second pro-Shah coup launched with the assistance
of the American government. 4 Of course, under U.S. domestic law,
the Carter administration could not have extradited the Shah to Iran
because there was no extradition treaty in effect between the two coun-
tries.65 Nevertheless, it can be argued that by analogy to Article 146 of
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3 ("All Members shall settle their international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered.").
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1 ('The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice.").
60. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
61. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.
6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
62. The Caroline in 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 412 (1906); W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 776-79 (2d ed. 1962). This author does not approve of recog-nizing the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense under the U.N. Charter.
63. Cf International Law Commission, Draft Article 34 on State Responsibility, re-
printedin Schwebel, The hirty-Second Session of the International Law Commission, 74 AM.
J. INT'L L. 961, 963 (1980) ("The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an
international obligation of that State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of
self-defense taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.").
64. See P. SALINGER, supra note 45, at 48, 130.
65. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1976), an extradition treaty is required between the
U.S. and a foreign nation to enable the extradition of a person who has committed a crime.
Such an extradition treaty does not exist between the U.S. and Iran. 18 U.S.C. § 3184
(1976). The United States Supreme Court has held that both domestic and international law
preclude the President or his agents from surrendering any person to a foreign government
in the absence of an extradition treaty. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936).
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the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the United States government
had an affirmative obligation either to bring the Shah before its own
courts, or else to hand him over for trial to another High Contracting
Party (e.g., Iran) for the commission of "grave breaches" as defined by
Article 147 (e.g., willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, or will-
fully causing great suffering or serious injury to bodily health) during
the course of an Article 3 non-international armed conflict. 66 Yet the
United States Congress has failed to enact the legislation necessary to
implement Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Therefore,
the Shah and. others who are alleged to have committed "grave
breaches" currently cannot be extradited or tried before U.S. courts.
The Iranian government could plausibly argue that the United States
was derelict in its legal duties under Article 146 by not having previ-
ously enacted such implementing legislation. Consequently, the
United States could not plead the infirmity of its domestic law to ex-
cuse the violation of international law arising from its refusal either to
extradite or to try the Shah.67 Moreover, the Carter administration's
favorable response to the Shah's request willfully placed the United
States government in violation of international law, because it was ob-
vious at the time of the admission of the Shah that neither alternative
was possible under U.S. domestic law.
The United States has no national security interest in granting polit-
ical asylum to deposed dictators who have committed "grave breaches"
of the Fourth Geneva Convention and engaged in a consistent pattern
of gross violations of fundamental human rights. A rudimentary
knowledge of international human rights law and international human-
itarian law governing armed conflict would have clearly indicated that
the Carter administration should not have admitted the Shah into this
country except to prosecute him or return him to Iran. The outbreak of
the Iranian hostage crisis over the admission of the Shah indicates
clearly that Congress must pass the necessary implementing legislation
required under the appropriate provisions of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention and, in addition, that the United States should ratify the Geno-
cide Convention and Congress should enact its necessary implementing
legislation as soon as possible.68 This elementary statutory framework
would officially put on notice current and deposed dictators who are
66. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
August 12, 1949, arts. 3, 146, 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 3616, 3618.
67. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27,
at 289, 292 (1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679, 690 (1969).
68. Franck, The Iran Crisis... If We Had Ratifed the Genocide Convention, INT'L
PRAc. NOTEBOOK, Jan., 1980, at 12.
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gross human rights violators that they risk criminal prosecution or ex-
tradition to their homelands if they travel to the United States. Such a
publicly stated American policy should deter their requests for admis-
sion, and thus forestall international complications like the Iranian
hostage crisis. This approach would also enable the United States to
maintain normal diplomatic relations with successor governments.
The above arguments are not intended to excuse or condone the Ira-
nian seizure and detention of U.S. diplomats, but only to point out that
there was a plausible legal argument on the Iranian side that should
have been taken into account by the Carter administration. At a mini-
mum the Iranian peoplefelt they possessed legitimate fears of, and sub-
stantial grievances against the United States that motivated the
Embassy seizure. Thus, the Carter administration should have dealt
with these Iranian perceptions as part of the definitional framework of
the crisis. At the outset the administration should have publicly ac-
knowledged that the Iranian people had presented a series of grave
complaints against the United States under international law and that
the American government was prepared to submit the entire dispute
immediately to the U.N. Security Council or a mutually acceptable in-
ternational tribunal. Such acknowledgement would have injected an
element of fluidity into the crisis that could have facilitated a negoti-
ated solution.
D. President Carter's Self-Righteousness
The Carter administration never recognized the validity of the Ira-
nian position. It manipulated the symbolic meaning of the crisis as
part of a strategy to convince domestic and international public opinion
that the United States was completely in the right and Iran completely
in the wrong. The realities of political life do not lend themselves to
such dogmatic assertions and foreign policy recommendations should
not be based on them. For crisis managers to believe otherwise is sim-
ply an exercise in self-delusion.
For example, the Carter administration insisted that the hostage-tak-
ers be called "terrorists ' 69 instead of university "students" (which they
were)70 or even "militants," 71 a more neutral term used by the Ameri-
69. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1979, at Al, col. 5; id., Nov. 13, 1979, at A10, col. 5;
id., Nov. 16, 1979, at A16, col. 1; id., Nov. 19, 1979, at A13, col. 1; Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1979,
at A16, col. 1.
70. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, at Al, col. 6; Id., Nov. 16, 1979, at Al, col. 5; Id.,
Nov. 19, 1979, at Al, col. 6; Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1979, at Al, col. 5.
71. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1979, at Al, col. 5; Id., Dec. 16, 1979, at Al, col. 3;
Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1979, at Al, col. 3; Id., Nov. 18, 1979, at Al, col. 4. Cf. N.Y. Times,
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can news media. This characterization was intended to produce revul-
sion among the American people and to build public support for the
administration's handling of the crisis. The hostage-takers, the admin-
istration suggested, were just like P.L.O./Baader-Meinhoff/Red Bri-
gade "terrorists" who indiscriminately kill innocent men, women, and
children for political purposes. The administration depicted the Ira-
nian "terrorists" as part of the monolithic bloc known as "international
terrorism'--a conspiracy directed against the vital national interests of
the United States and the entire "Free World." This tactic produced a
self-fulfilling prophecy. The United States could not accede to Iranian
requests because it could not be seen catering to the demands of "inter-
national terrorism." One does not make concessions to "terrorists" be-
cause concessions simply encourage more "terrorism." Indeed, one
does not even negotiate with "terrorists"-one kills them. This charac-
terization of the crisis locked the Carter administration into a difficult
negotiating position and rendered the ultimate costs of negotiation
much higher than otherwise would have been the case. By attempting
to manipulate the crisis to its own advantage in this fashion, the Carter
administration lost control over its development.
Even today, the Reagan administration's persistent characterization
of the Iranian hostage-taking as an act of "international terrorism" im-
pedes the formulation of a rational policy towards Iran that can protect
America's legitimate national security interests in a manner consistent
with the requirements of international law. Apparently this perception
has led the Reagan administration to foment a campaign to destabilize
the Khomeini government by sponsoring paramilitary raids launched
from Turkey into Iran by various Iranian opposition groups. This de-
velopment represents a retrograde step for both American national se-
curity interests in the Persian Gulf and the international legal order.
The delusion of self-righteousness influenced the Carter administra-
tion's opposition to an early suggestion by then Acting Foreign Minis-
ter Abolhassan Bani-Sadr to bring the crisis before the U.N. Security
Council.72 The U.S. rationale was that the Iranians had committed an
act of terrorism beyond the bounds of international law and diplomatic
practice and therefore were not entitled to air any complaints against
the United States in an international forum until the hostages were
Nov. 7, 1979, at Al, col. 6 ("militant Islamic students"); id., Nov. 19, 1979, at Al, col. 6
("militant students"); Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1979, at Al, col. I ("militant Iranian students").
72. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1979, at Al, col. 6; id., Nov. 16, 1979, at A16, col. 1; Wash.
Post, Nov. 15, 1979, at Al, col. 5.
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freed.73 The Carter administration should have accepted the Bani-Sadr
proposal with alacrity.74 Even if it did not terminate the crisis, accept-
ance would have strengthened the authority of Bani-Sadr (who, at the
time, was genuinely committed to a negotiated settlement of the cri-
sis) 75 within the struggle for power in Iran. Failure of the Bani-Sadr
initiative contributed to his ouster as Acting Foreign Minister76 and his
departure from the center of the political stage until his election as
President in January, 1980.77 The absence of Bani-Sadr's moderating
influence as Foreign Minister during this crucial phase of the crisis per-
haps contributed to a hardening of positions.
E. Alternatives of International Law
In its description of the events surrounding the crisis, the Carter ad-
ministration purposefully truncated the beginning of the sequence to
present the dispute with Iran in a manner most favorable to the posi-
tion of the United States. In an effort to defuse the crisis, it should have
admitted its legal and political responsibility for starting the crisis.
The Carter administration was correct finally in bringing the matter
to the attention of the Security Council,78 and in going to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to secure provisional measures79 and a final
73. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1979, at Al, col. 6; Id., Nov. 16, 1979, at A16, col. 1; id., Nov.
9, 1979, at A20, col. 1; Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1979, at Al, col. 5; Id., Nov. 18, 1979, at All,
col. I.
74. Secret negotiations may have been in the offing in mid-November, 1979, between
Secretary of State Vance and Bani-Sadr, when the then Acting Iranian Foreign Minister was
to have visited the U.N. to present the Iranian position. Vance had made several secret trips
with regard to the release of the hostages during this period. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, at
A14, col. I (interview with Cyrus Vance).
75. See P. SALINGER, supra note 45, at 43, 104, 107.
76. Bani-Sadr was dismissed as Acting Foreign Minister on Nov. 28, 1979, having been
appointed to that post on Nov. 10, 1979 following the collapse of the Bazargan Government.
He retained his post as Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh,
Director of State Television, replaced Bani-Sadr as Foreign Minister. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29,
1979, at Al, col. 3; id. at A18, col. 5.
77. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1980, at A9, col. I.
78. United Nations Security Council Resolution 457, U.N. Doc. S/13677 (Dec. 4, 1979),
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1644 (1979), called on the government of Iran immedi-
ately to release all personnel of the U.S. Embassy being held hostage in Teheran and re-
quested the U.N. Secretary-General to lend his good offices for its implementation. Iran's
failure to abide by Resolution 457 (1979) precipitated the passage of Security Council Reso-
lution 461, U.N. Doc. S/13711/Rev. 1 (Dec. 31, 1979), reprinted in 19 IN'TL LEGAL MATS.
250 (1980), which reaffirmed Resolution 457 and deplored the continued detention of the
hostages. It again called on Iran to release immediately all persons of United States nation-
ality being held hostage in Iran and reiterated the earlier request to the Secretary-General to
lend his good offices with a view toward achieving the objectives called for therein.
79. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran
(United States of America v. Iran) (Interim Protection), 1979 I.C.J. 7, reprinted in 74 AM. J.
IN'rL L. 258 (1980).
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judgment against Iran.80 The Council and the Court decisions contrib-
uted significantly to the crisis resolution by authoritatively defining the
legal obligation of Iran to release the hostages to the satisfaction of the
entire international community. At the same time, however, these deci-
sions induced the Carter administration to adopt a "rectificatory" ap-
proach to the Iranian hostage crisis and to act as a plaintiff vindicated
on all counts of its complaint.
Though crisis managers must always take international law into ac-
count, in the nuclear age their immediate objective must be to resolve
the crisis, even, if necessary, by sacrificing unassailable legal arguments
in their government's favor. This is the fundamental distinction be-
tween a legalistic and "rectificatory" attitude toward crisis management
and an approach that draws creatively upon the potential of interna-
tional law and organizations as tools for the peaceful settlement of in-
ternational disputes. Self-righteousness and fear of adverse electoral
consequences led the Carter administration to neglect an elementary
principle of crisis management: placing one's self in the shoes of the
adversary as part of an effort to find the basis for compromise, then
taking the first steps in that direction.8'
The Carter administration's primary concern should not have been
to compel Iran to obey the decisions of the World Court and the Secur-
ity Council, but rather to convince the Iranian students that release of
the hostages could be accomplished in a manner consistent with their
principles. Under the circumstances, the most prudent course for the
United States would have been to gradually de-escalate the crisis by
announcing a series of unilateral concessions on principle to Iran, with-
out asking for, or even expecting, immediate reciprocal gestures.82 To
support this effort, the Carter administration should have publicly
taken the position that the crisis was not a mortal confrontation be-
tween two nations, but only an unfortunate incident beyond the control
of the Iranian government that could be settled peacefully by mutual
good faith efforts. Accordingly, it should have stated its formal legal
position that, due to the revolutionary conditions in Iran, the United
States would not hold the Iranian government legally responsible for
the hostage-taking by the students. The incident should have been
80. See 'Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran
(United States of America v. Iran) (Merits), 1980 I.C.J. 3, reprintedin DE,'T ST. BULL., July,
1980, at 43.
81. See R. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS (1970); Fisher, Helping
the Iranians Change Their Minds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 23, col. 1.
82. Cf. C. OSGOOD, AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR OR SURRENDER 86-134 (1962) (strategy
for gradual reduction in tension-GRIT).
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characterized as an act of mob violence that, under generally recog-
nized principles of international law, did not engage state responsibil-
ity.83 Even if the Iranian government had felt compelled to repudiate
this interpretation of the event and formally to associate itself with the
students, as it later did, the Carter administration should have persisted
in this position. The Iranian government's assumption of responsibility
for the hostage-taking became a valuable political asset to those revolu-
tionary factions seeking a confrontation with the United States to bol-
ster their internal power position.
The Carter administration carelessly played into their hands. With
some patience and fortitude, American treatment of the hostage-taking
as an act of mob violence might have led to a gradual de-escalation of
the crisis by providing those Iranian leaders who favored release of the
hostages some room to maneuver against their adversaries. An interna-
tional crisis can sometimes be successfully transformed into a non-crisis
if the party possessing overwhelming political, military, and economic
power resolutely sets out to do so. Unfortunately, the Carter adminis-
tration's mismanagement of the Iranian hostage crisis exemplifies the
validity of the converse of this proposition.
As another element of a concerted effort to defuse the crisis, Presi-
dent Carter should have announced his sponsorship of the formation of
a congressional committee to investigate the history of C.I.A. activities
in Iran, especially the Agency's role in the 1953 restoration of the Shah.
He should have further undertaken speedily to publish all executive
branch documentation relevant to the investigation as well as the com-
mittee's final report.84 President Carter also should have proposed the
immediate creation of an impartial international commission mutually
acceptable to Iran and the United States possessing the necessary com-
petence to investigate and adjudicate the claims of each government.
Such a commission would have circumvented the Iranian objection to
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. American consent
to the creation of an international commission should have been given
without the incapacitating condition subsequently proposed by the
Carter administration, that the hostages be freed before the commission
issue its final report. President Carter should have stated his intention
to apologize for any violations of international law which the commis-
sion found to have been committed by the United States government
and his readiness to recommend that Congress pay reparations to Iran
83. See, eg., Hershey, The Cavo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1907).
84. Cf. Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1980, at Al, col. 2 (report ordered by President Carter).
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for such violations in an amount to be determined by the commission.
If necessary to the success of this plan, the Carter administration
should have intimated its willingness to disclaim any right of setoff
from Iranian assets for damages arising as a result of violations of in-
ternational law connected with the seizure and detention of the hos-
tages. Even if the cumulative effect of all these actions would not have
obtained the release of the hostages, the administration could have rep-
resented that it had scrupulously fulfilled even the most exacting re-
quirements of international law concerning the peaceful settlement of
international disputes with a minor state.
F. The Administration's Honor
An obstacle to a speedy negotiated solution to the crisis proved to be
the Carter administration's insistence that the "honor" of the United
States precluded the American apology demanded by Iran.8 5 The
"honor" of the United States was never at stake in the Iranian hostage
crisis; rather only the "honor" of the Carter administration and its abil-
ity to get re-elected was threatened. 6 The administration manipulated
the crisis to its electoral advantage throughout the 1980 presidential
campaign. Exploiting popular loyalty to the President in a time of cri-
sis, President Carter overcame Senator Edward Kennedy's substantial
lead in the polls, and clinched the Democratic nomination by May,
1980.87 With the nomination secured, President Carter's campaign
cynically downplayed the significance of the crisis throughout the sum-
mer of 1980 so that Ronald Reagan would not be tempted to use it as
evidence of the President's incompetence in foreign affairs.88 The crisis
did not revive as a major campaign issue until just before the Novem-
ber 4 election, when the Iranian parliament finally announced its con-
ditions for the release of the hostages.8 9 Once President Carter had lost
the election, the crisis was successfully resolved, delayed only by Amer-
ican banks negotiating with Iran the price of freedom for the
85. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1979, at A18, col. 5; Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1979, at Al, col. 3.
86. For an analysis of Thucydides' classic argument against foreign policy decision-mak-
ers taking "honor" into consideration, see Boyle, Power Politics, supra note 6, at 910-12.
87. See Radway, The Curse ofFree Elections, FOREGN POL'Y, Fall, 1980, at 61, 67-69.
Compare N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1980, at A8, col. 5 (President Carter's pre-Wisconsin primary
press conference) with H. KiSSINGER, WHrrE HousE YEARS 1399-1400 (1979) ("peace is at
hand" speech).
88. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1980, at Al, col. 6. See Reston, Puzzles41ong the Potomac, id,
May 2, 1980, at A27, col. 1; Smith, Why the President Released54th Hostage, id. at B6, col. 1;
Wicker, The Candor Gap, ld. at A27, col. 5.
89. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1980, at Al, coL 6.
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hostages.90
To its credit the Carter administration did not resort to a military
blockade or invasion of Iran and did attempt to pursue a peaceful reso-
lution of the crisis at the outset. Yet the Carter administration insinu-
ated that the use of military force remained open as a viable option
under unspecified circumstances, 91 and this threat undercut the signifi-
cance of its peaceful overtures. If President Carter had intended to
pursue a negotiated settlement, it was counterproductive to engage in
any hint, threat, or use of force, or to take any retaliatory measures
against Iran. Nevertheless, he undertook several such actions, includ-
ing ordering two U.S. naval task forces with assault troops to the In-
dian Ocean and Arabian Sea,92 freezing Iranian governmental assets in
order to protect the interests of U.S. banks while the Shah remained at
liberty to secrete his assets abroad,93 deporting Iranian students,94 seek-
ing economic sanctions against Iran at the U.N. Security Council95 and
failing because of a Soviet veto in the aftermath of the Afghanistan
invasion,96 and imposing economic sanctions unilaterally 97 and in con-
junction with U.S. allies. 98 The administration's severance of diplo-
matic relations with Iran was also unwise.99 This step complicated the
hostage release negotiations. a0 Without these measures the Carter ad-
ministration could have preserved the effectiveness of a peaceful ap-
proach to the crisis settlement. As was often the case, however, the
President's foreign policy represented an unworkable compromise of
power politics and international law. President Carter's mutually in-
consistent approaches stalemated negotiations with Iran.
90. P. SALINGER, supra note 45, at 287.
91. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1979, at Al, col. 6.
92. J. Collins, 6 U.S.-So Wet Military Balance: Far East, Middle EastAssessments, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. REP. No. 80-166 S, at 71 (July 1980).
93. Iranian Assets Control Regulations, Exec. Orders Nos. 12276-84, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913
etseq., re.pealing Exec. Order 12211, 3 C.F.R. 253 (1980) & Exec. Order 12170 3 C.F.R. 457
(1979).
94. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1979, at 1, col. 4; id, Nov. 13, 1979, at A8, col. 5.
95. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1979, at 1, col. 6; U.S. Asks Security Council to Impose Sanc-
tions Against Iran, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb., 1980, at 67.
96. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1980, at Al, col. 5; Soviets Veto Sanctions Against Iran, DEP'T
ST. BULL., Mar., 1980, at 60.
97. Additional Sanctions Against Iran, DEP'T ST. BULL., June, 1980, at 43; Constable,
U.S. Measures to Isolate Iran, DEP'T ST. BULL., July, 1980, at 71.
98. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1980, at Al, col. 4; Iran Chronology. May 1980, DEP'T ST.
BULL., July, 1980, at 72. But see How Iran Is Getting the Goods Through the Barriers, MID-
DLE EAST, Oct., 1980, at 72. See generalo , Reisman, The Legal Effect of Vetoed Resolutions,
74 AM. J. INT'L L. 904 (1980).
99. See Nash, Contemporary Practice ofthe United States Relating to International Law:
Termination ofRelations, 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 657 (1980).
100. See generally Cutler, Negotiating the Iranian Settlement, 67 A.B.A. J. 996 (1981).
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To overcome this predicament, President Carter should have given
explicit pledges before the U.N. Security Council repudiating the threat
or use of force to resolve the hostage crisis under any circumstances,
and promising that the United States would never again intervene in
Iran's domestic affairs. Such pledges would have been consistent with
the moral values on which the United States was founded. Indeed,
they would have amounted to a formal reiteration of American obliga-
tions under the United Nations Charter and general principles of inter-
national law. A pledge of nonintervention might also have defused
Soviet fears that the United States intended to take military action
against the Khomeini government, planning to replace it with another
pro-American, anti-Russian regime as the U.S. had done in 1953.101
Those fears may arguably have prompted the Russians to invade Af-
ghanistan to secure a firm military foothold that would offset the antici-
pated geopolitical reversal of the advantageous consequences flowing
from the anti-Shah revolution. Prompt, forthright, and credible U.S.
pledges not to use force or covert intervention during the crisis, sup-
ported by abstaining from building up military forces in Southwest
Asia, could have undercut the position of those in the Kremlin who
might have been arguing for an Afghanistan invasion on this basis.
G. The Rescue Mission Fiasco
One outstanding example of an ill-advised use of force was the
American hostage rescue operation of April, 1980. The mission was
misguided in conception, planning, and execution. It fortunately
aborted before resulting in an even greater catastrophe: 0 2 the deaths
of most of the hostages, substantial casualties among the rescuers and
Iranians, hostilities between the United States and Iran, permanent em-
bitterment of their mutual relations, and further opportunities for So-
viet penetration and destabilization of Iran. The argument that a
"successful" rescue operation would at least decisively terminate the
crisis one way or another and thus restore some semblance of normality
to the situation overlooks the fact that the United States provoked and
mismanaged the crisis. In one stroke President Carter destroyed all the
initiatives for peaceful settlement being pursued by Secretary of State
Vance and sidetracked the negotiations until the fall of 1980. It was
understandable, therefore, that Vance decided to resign in advance of
101. See P. SALINGER, supra note 45, at 105.
102. Compare Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention, 230 NATION at 612 (1980), with
Crown & Fried,A LegalDisaster, id at 613. The Special Operations Review Group, Rescue
Mission Report (Aug., 1980) (the Holloway Commission Report), was a whitewash.
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the operation, 10 3 that American allies retreated from imposing eco-
nomic sanctions despite prior agreement, 104 and that the U.S. earned
the enmity of the Islamic world. 10 5 The rescue operation demolished
the principled nature and appeal of the American position that had
been carefully constructed by Vance and his Legal Adviser on the solid
foundation of international law. From this point on the Carter admin-
istration could no longer convincingly argue in its bid for world sup-
port that the U.S. was completely in the right and Iran was completely
in the wrong. Until all the facts surrounding the raid are disclosed,
tentative conclusions as to its legality under international law are com-
pletely unwarranted. Until the United States discharges its burden of
proof the mission remains presumptively illegal.
Secretary Vance was the only one of the President's top advisers who
opposed the rescue operation and he was not even present when the
decision to intervene was made. 106 His deputy, Warren Christopher,
attended the decisive meeting while Vance was on vacation. 10 7 Chris-
topher was previously unaware of the rescue mission plan, and as-
sumed that Vance had already given his consent to a matter of such
fundamental importance. On his return to Washington, Vance was
confronted with the impossible task of reversing a decision that had
already been unanimously endorsed by the President and his advis-
ers.'0 8 The psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance un-
doubtedly and predictably led to the defeat of Vance's arguments
against the wisdom of the raid when the crisis management team
reconvened. 109
The absence of Vance, the lone dissenter, may well have been more
than just a coincidence. Vance was apparently excluded from the deci-
sive meeting to avoid a direct and heated confrontation with President
Carter and the administration's other top crisis managers, who had al-
103. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1980, at Al, col. 6; Shaplen, Profiles (David Newsom-pt. 2),
NEw YORKER, June 9, 1980,48, at 48-50. Seegeneraly id (pts. 1 & 3), NEw YORKER, June
2, 1980, 43 & id, June 16, 1980, 44.
104. Compare N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1980, at Al, col. 3 (E.E.C. ministers vote to impose
sanctions just before rescue operation) with id, Apr. 28, 1980, at Al, col. 4 (E.E.C. irritation
over raid) andid, May 17, 1980, at 6, col. 5 (Britain, France, West Germany intend to back
off) andid, May 19, 1980, at Al, col. I (at Naples conference, E.E.C. bans exports to Iran
pursuant to contracts signed after Nov. 4, 1979, leaving virtually all major European con-
tracts with Iran unaffected) andid, May 23, 1980, at A5, col. 1 (Britain adopts sanctions only
with respect to new contracts).
105. Id, May 22, 1980, at A20, col. 1.
106. Shaplen, Profiles (David Newsom-pt. 2), NEw YORKER, June 9, 1980, 48, at 48-50.
107. Id
108. Id
109. See, e.g., Aronson, .The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: .4 Current Perspective, 4
ADvANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1969).
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ready made up their minds in favor of a raid. Arguably, the decision to
launch the raid might not have been made, despite their personal pref-
erences, if Vance had been afforded the opportunity to offer his argu-
ments against the raid at the decisive meeting and, if necessary, had
threatened to resign if the raid was ultimately sanctioned. A threat by
Vance to resign made before the decision to launch the raid could have
exerted a more profound impact upon the decision-making process
than his implicit threat to resign if the decision already taken was not
subsequently reversed. In the aftermath of Vance's resignation, Presi-
dent Carter skillfully selected Senator Edmund Muskie to succeed
Vance, thus avoiding a proposed full-scale investigation of the rescue
mission by the Senate during the course of its confirmation hearings.
The Senators treated one of their own number with customary senato-
rial courtesy that did not permit intensive questioning.
This episode indicates that the standard crisis management proce-
dures of the U.S. government had completely broken down. Such a
breakdown illustrates a basic deficiency in the way considerations of
international law and involvement with international organizations are
presented to key American foreign policymakers. The task of render-
ing legal opinions to them is within the organizational prerogative of
the Secretary of State, who is assisted by the Legal Adviser and his
staff.110 The Attorney General is not routinely included in interna-
tional crisis management teams. Therefore, the Secretary of State must
consider and balance both the political and the legal aspects of the situ-
ation before he makes his final recommendation to the crisis team.
This practice risks subordination, or at least diminution, of legal con-
siderations to the political dimension of the crisis. Worse yet, legal ar-
guments are likely to be manufactured as ad hoc or ex post facto
justifications for decisions taken on the basis of power politics in viola-
tion of international law. The Legal Adviser is not bureaucratically
situated to insist on respect for international law during a crisis.
One promising initiative to correct this defect would be to require by
statute that the Attorney General sit as a permanent member of the
National Security Council and any subsidiary bodies established for
the purpose of crisis management."' This reform would permit the
Attorney General, drawing on the expertise of international lawyers in
both the Justice and the State Departments, to interject considerations
of international law directly into the crisis management process. The
110. See Bilder, The Ofce of the LegalAdviser: The Sltate Department Lawyer and For-
eign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633 (1962).
111. See 50 U.S.C. § 402 (1976).
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Justice Department would have a voice and a vote equal to, and in-
dependent of, the Defense and State Departments and the Central In-
telligence Agency. The legal aspects of the crisis would not risk
dilution by the foreign policy dimension in a stage prior to their presen-
tation before the determinative body. Of course, once the legal aspects
are presented they will have to compete with ideas drawn from other
perspectives. Significantly, however, legal ideas would be presented on
a direct, equal, and independent basis. With the presence of the Attor-
ney General, international law would gain an advocate to compete for
influence over the formulation of American foreign policy with those
leaders advocating reliance on Machiavellian power politics. 112
III. Superpower Politics
Perhaps the most persuasive explanation for the admission of the
Shah into the United States was the reported threat by Henry Kissinger
to oppose ratification of the SALT II Treaty if President Carter did not
acquiesce. 13 Starting in the late 1950s the Shah had funnelled much of
Iran's oil money through the Chase Manhattan Bank, 114 whose chair-
man was David Rockefeller, and Kissinger had been a Rockefeller
family protege throughout his public career.115 During the Nixon and
Ford administrations Kissinger was the architect of dbtente,116 the cen-
terpiece of which was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). A
substantial portion of SALT II had been negotiated under his personal
direction. 117
By late summer, 1979, however, Kissinger seemed primarily con-
cerned with positioning himself for reappointment as Secretary of State
in a new Republican administration. Except for John Anderson, the
major Republican presidential candidates opposed ratification of
SALT II. It was apparent that Kissinger would not be reappointed if
he publicly and unequivocally supported SALT II. Consequently, Kis-
singer's testimony on the Treaty before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations 18 became an exercise in dissimulation and obfuscation
112. Cf. Boyle, Entebbe, supra note 26, at 787-89 (Israeli practice).
113. See, e.g., Washington Wire, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1979, at 1, col. 5. See also Lewis,
Mr. Kissinger's Role, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1979, at A21, col. 1.
114. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1979, at A19, col. 1, at col. 3. See generally id, Jan. 10,
1979, at A3, col. 3.
115. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1979, § 3, at 1, col. 1; id at 11, col. 3.
116. See generalol H. KssiNGER,supra note 87, at 132, 949, 964, 966, 1117, 1143, 1255-
57.
117. 3 The SALT11 Treaty: Hearings Be/ore the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1979) (statement of Senator Frank Church).
118. Id at 151-233.
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over a matter concerning the vital national security interests of the
United States. At the hearings, Kissinger conditioned tepid support of
SALT II on, inter alia, a significant arms buildup and the Senate's im-
position of debilitating restrictions 19 on the ability of the President to
engage in strategic arms negotiations. Kissinger's qualified support for
SALT II was so evanescent as to be meaningless. His testimony proved
so innocuous that it could not have seriously jeopardized his reappoint-
ment prospects. He might have deserved some credit for resisting the
temptation to repudiate SALT II entirely' 20 if he had not apparently
bargained his continued non-opposition for admission of the Shah.
That decision set in motion a chain of events that may have prompted
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the tabling of SALT II. Kis-
singer's statements on Salt II and the Iranian hostage crisis have been
so opportunistic and unprincipled that the American people should dis-
regard in the future his advice on the conduct of foreign policy.
A. The Soviet Brigade in Cuba
Kissinger's position on SALT II was crucial because the Treaty hung
by a thread in the Senate over President Carter's self-induced difficul-
ties concerning the Soviet "combat brigade" stationed in Cuba. As
pressure mounted on the President to redress the ostensible Soviet mili-
tary threat to Latin America and the Caribbean, he declared that the
status quo in Cuba was "unacceptable."' 12 1 This statement implied that
the Soviets must either remove their combat troops from Cuba, or else
eliminate their allegedly offensive military capabilities. When the So-
viets refused to budge, the President accepted the "unacceptable."
These events proved calamitous for SALT II's chances in the Senate.
Senator Frank Church, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and a key figure in the SALT ratification process, had for-
mally "linked" its ratification to the achievement of a change in the
Cuban status quo. President Carter bears significant responsibility for
Church's position even though the President publicly opposed this in-
stance of "linkage."'2
119. Id at 159.
120. Kissinger later criticized SALT II openly, and argued that without strong U.S. de-
fense programs, the SALT process could perpetuate inequality between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. See AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 3, 1980, at 28.
121. See, eg., Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1979, at AS, col. 1 (Carter speech). See generally U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET
TROOPS IN CUBA, CURRENT POLICY No. 93 (1979); N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1979, at A8, col. 1.
122. When intelligence sources confirmed that Soviet combat troops were stationed in
Cuba, President Carter was about to begin a vacation on the Mississippi River. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 19, at 26, col. 1. Secretary Vance directed the State Department to reveal the informa-
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"Linkage" was a concept pioneered by Kissinger during the Nixon
and Ford administrations. 12 The theory stemmed in part from his fail-
ure to see that strategic arms agreements between the two nuclear su-
perpowers should transcend any Machiavellian maneuvers of
geopolitics. "Linkage" is a tool of power politics, not of international
law. Predictably, therefore, linking SALT II and the Soviet combat
brigade in Cuba proved disastrous.
President Carter's mismanagement of what should have been a Cu-
ban non-crisis provided critics with additional evidence of his lack of
skill in foreign affairs. Before speaking about Soviet troops in Cuba
while SALT II teetered in the balance, he should have waited for fur-
ther intelligence information. When it arrived, it confirmed that such
troops had been stationed in Cuba with the full knowledge of previous
American administrations 2 4 as part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev
agreement that terminated the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962.
The heart of this arrangement involved Soviet removal of medium and
intermediate range ballistic missiles and jet bombers from Cuba in re-
turn for an American pledge not to invade that country overtly or co-
vertly.125 Soviet conventional troops remained in Cuba in order to
secure the pledge.126 They served as a "trip-wire" against American
invasion, making it probable that any outright assault on Cuba would
escalate into a direct superpower confrontation.
From the Soviet perspective, it was President Carter who strove to
reverse the status quo in Cuba by reneging on the Kennedy-
Khrushchev agreement. It reasonably appeared to the Soviets that the
U.S. government was using the threat of SALT II's non-ratification as a
tion to Church, apparently intending that Church have the privilege of first making the
intelligence public. Id, Aug. 31, 1979, at A2, col. 3; id, Sept. 1, 1979, at 1, col. 6. This
would give Church an opportunity to appear to be a hard-liner on defense matters at the
start of a difficult re-election campaign against vigorous conservative opposition inspired in
part by his liberal image on foreign affairs. Id, Sept. 10, 1979, at Al, col. 6. Presumably a
tough stand on the Soviet troops in Cuba would permit Church to take the soft stand of
supporting SALT II, which he favored. The strategy failed, however. Church called for
vigorous counteractive measures by the Carter administration, and backed up his demands
with the "linkage" to SALT II. At the request of Senator Church, the Senate Foreign Rela,
tions Committee adopted a declaration that SALT II would not be ratified until the Presi-
dent had assured the Senate that the Soviet troops in Cuba "are not engaged in a combat
role." Id, Nov. 3, 1979, at 10, col. 3. Out of deference to Church, the White House agreed
publicly to the "linkage." All this posturing was to no avail, however, for Church, like
President Carter, was defeated in his bid for re-election in November, 1980. See also Id,
Sept. 13, 1979, at A16, col. 4.
123. H. KISSINGER, supra note 87, at 129-30.
124. Bundy, The Brigade's My Fault, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1979, at 23, col. 2.
125. A. CHAYE, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
1120-49 (1969).
126. Weiss, Taking Salami Slices in Cuba, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1979, at 20, col. 4.
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Machiavellian club to force them into granting unjustified and humili-
ating concessions on Cuba. Hence the Soviets understandably refused
to capitulate to Carter's demands, and he had to content himself with
face-saving counter-measures tantamount to acceptance of the previ-
ously "unacceptable" status quo. 127 Irreparable damage, however, had
already been inflicted on SALT II. This experience may have induced
any optimists in the Soviet leadership to doubt the sincerity of Presi-
dent Carter's commitment to SALT II and dtente. Kremlin pessimists
may have concluded that President Carter was somehow trying to trick
them out of the mutual benefits realized by the SALT II Treaty.
B. The China Card
President Carter had already substantially retarded the progress of
the strategic arms limitation talks on two prior occasions. Shortly after
his inauguration, he unilaterally called for large nuclear weapons cuts
by both superpowers, much to Soviet astonishment.1 28 Such cuts would
have redounded to the distinct disadvantage of the Soviets because of
their preponderant reliance on land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), in contrast to America's "triad" of strategic nuclear
forces more evenly dispersed among ICBMs, submarine launched bal-
listic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic nuclear bombers. The Carter ini-
tiative effectively amounted to renunciation of the 1974 Vladivostok
agreement 29 concluded between President Ford and Soviet leader
Brezhnev on the basic principles for future SALT negotiations. The
Vance mission to Moscow with President Carter's suggestions in
March, 1977, was therefore doomed to failure. 130 The administration
withdrew the proposals and returned to the Vladivostok consensus, but
the negotiations were sidetracked for several months.' 3 ' The unfortu-
nate experience in this matter may indicate that the best course of ac-
tion for the Reagan administration would be to announce its support
for U.S. ratification of SALT II or some cosmetic substitute before
America proceeds any further with the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
(START) with the Soviet Union, and then work diligently to secure the
127. See DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov., 1979, at 7.
128. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
129. See Joint Statement on Strategic Offensive Arms Issued at Vladivostok Nov. 24,
reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec., 1974, at 879. See also Joint Communiqu6 Signed at
Vladivostok Nov. 24, reprinted in id
130. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1977, at Al, col. 6.
131. News Conference held by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at Geneva on May 21,
1977, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., June, 1977, at 628; Joint Communiqu6, reprinted in id at
633.
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advice and consent of the Senate. Future progress must be based on
the consolidation of past gains.
President Carter's second mistake related to SALT II was the inop-
portune decision announced in December, 1978, to accord full diplo-
matic recognition to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.).
132 This
act represented the culmination of Kissinger's strategy of establishing a
three-way balance of power among the United States, the Soviet
Union, and mainland China. By instituting a political relationship
with the P.R.C., Kissinger sought to generate a new source of leverage
over the Soviet Union that could be exploited on numerous issues: e.g.,
the Viet Nam War, d&Iente, and SALT. It was a textbook example of
the practical application of a Machiavellian theory of power politics on
a global scale in the nuclear age. But President Carter's decision to
"play the China card" created at this time another serious setback for
the SALT negotiations with the Soviets. It was not until mid-June,
1979, six months after the recognition of the P.R.C., that SALT II was
finally signed in Vienna, 133 a time perilously close to the beginning of
the 1980 presidential campaign. This hiatus meant that SALT II would
become hostage to the vicissitudes of American electoral politics and
could not be evaluated on its merits alone. To phrase this proposition
more precisely, the ratification of SALT II was ultimately recom-
mended on its merits alone by the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, subject to certain declarations, understandings, and reservations,
but was not ratified for political reasons that were extraneous to the
Treaty's intrinsic value as an arms control measure.
1 34
Another consequence of the diplomatic recognition of China was the
subsequent visit of Deng Xiaoping to the United States in late January,
1979. Deng used this opportunity to make threats against Vietnam,135
which had invaded and conquered Cambodia. Deng successfully
manipulated his visit so that China's punitive invasion of Vietnam
some two weeks later after Deng's return home appeared to have tacit
American support. 136 Ironically, Deng shrewdly played his "American
card" against the Soviet Union in order to forestall Soviet military re-
taliation against China for the invasion of their Vietnamese ally. From
132. See East Asia" U.S. Normalizes Relations with the People's Republic of China, id,
Jan., 1979, at 25.
133. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SALT II AGREEMENT, SE-
LECTED DOCUMENTS No. 12A (June 18, 1979).
134. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE SALT
II TREATY, EXEC. REP. No. 96-14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
135. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1979, at A16, col. 4.
136. See id, Feb. 18, 1979, 1, at 1, col. 6.
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the Soviet perspective, the Carter administration had become an ac-
complice to Chinese aggression. The Kremlin leadership must have
debated whether further to advance a long-term Soviet strategy for
containing the newly belligerent China by the invasion and occupation
of Afghanistan. Perhaps as a precautionary measure, the Soviets sub-
stantially increased their supply of military equipment to the Marxist
Afghanistan government in March, 1979.137 China seemed to be mov-
ing toward a formal military alignment with the United States. Indeed,
on April 19, 1979, Deng Xiaoping offered to co-operate with the United
States in establishing electronic intelligence gathering stations on Chi-
nese territory. These stations would monitor Soviet missile test sites
previously observed from stations in Iran that were shut down after the
Shah's ouster.
138
C. Afghanistan and SALT 11
As it turned out, the SALT II process accelerated the pace of the
nuclear arms race. Part of the price President Carter chose to pay for
approval of SALT II by his Joint Chiefs of Staff was the decision, an-
nounced in September, 1979,139 to deploy a land-based MX missile sys-
tem in a racetrack basing mode.' 40 With its ten multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the land-based MX threatened to
destabilize the strategic nuclear balance between the two superpowers.
It purported to provide the United States with an offensive first-strike
capability against fixed Soviet ICBMs, which constitute about 72% of
Soviet strategic nuclear forces. 141 Because of this imbalance in compar-
ison to the American triad, the land-based MX will create a vulnerabil-
ity problem for the Soviets that is far more serious and threatening than
the so-called "window of vulnerability" alleged to be facing U.S.
ICBMs for the rest of this decade. 142 The Soviets will be forced to re-
137. See Garrity, The Soviet Military Stake in Afghanistan 1956-79, J. ROYAL UNITED
SERV. INST., Sept., 1980, at 31, reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, CURRENT
NEWS, SPECIAL EDITION, Feb. 26, 1981, No. 676, at 6.
138. See N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, at Al, col. 2; id, July 2, 1981, at 6, col. 1; Spying on
Russia Writh China's Help, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 29, 1981, at 10; Wash. Post,
June 18, 1981, at A34, col. 1; id, June 19, 1981, at A10, col. 3.
139. MX Missile System, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov., 1979, at 25.
140. This author approves of the Reagan administration's decision to abandon the
"dragstrip" MX basing mode. See Boyle, Should SALT II Be Ratfed?, INT'L PRAC.
NOTEBOOK, January, 1981, at 12; Boyle, Comment, 74 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 218 (1980).
See also Feld & Tsipis, Land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, ScI. AM., Nov., 1979,
at 51.
141. See Chayes, Response, 74 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 219 (1980); Gray, The MX
ICBM and Nuclear Strateg, 14 INT'L DEF. REv. 855 (1981).
142. Committee on the Present Danger, Is America Becoming Number 2? (Oct. 5, 1978).
See generally Barnet, The Searchfor National Security, NEw YORKER, Apr. 27, 1981, at 50.
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spond by deploying a mobile light ICBM system of their own in order
to counter the U.S. MX threat. Mutual deployment of such ICBM sys-
tems by both superpowers, as permitted by SALT II, will complete the
first stage in the post-SALT II nuclear arms race.
The MX decision quickly followed the signature of SALT II. It de-
stroyed whatever good will, trust, and momentum for the future had
been generated there, and poisoned the atmosphere for the proposed
SALT III negotiations concerning theater nuclear forces (TNF) in Eu-
rope. Furthermore, in mid-December, 1979, NATO announced its de-
cision to deploy 108 Pershing 2 missiles and 464 ground-launched
cruise missiles in Europe allegedly to counter Soviet SS-20s. 143 Alter-
natively, the deployment of fast and accurate American Pershing 2s in
Europe could also provide the United States with a seemingly effective
first-strike capability against strategic ICBM silos located within the
Soviet Union itself. From the Politburo's perspective, this decision,
purportedly concerning only modernization of theater nuclear weap-
ons, substantially undermined the value of the SALT II limitations on
American strategic nuclear weapons systems.
Whatever the merits of this Euro-missile trade-off, the timing and
multitude of decisions on major nuclear weapons systems coupled with
the Soviet troops in Cuba incident and the proposed trip of Secretary of
Defense Brown to China, undercut the credibility of the U.S. govern-
ment with the Soviet Union in regard, to arms control and d&tente.
With SALT II apparently dead, the MX missile alive, new theater nu-
clear weapons on the way for NATO, an American military rapproche-
ment with the P.R.C., and intimations that the U.S. might invade Iran
and replace Khomeini in response to the hostage crisis, the Soviets
were given every incentive to violate the so-called "code of detente"'144
by the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
led President Carter to withdraw SALT II from consideration by the
Senate, and the centerpiece of his administration's foreign policy to-
ward the Soviet Union collapsed.
I do not subscribe to the thesis that the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan was a defensive maneuver designed to prevent the spread of Is-
lamic fundamentalism from Khomeini's Iran into Soviet Central Asia
by shoring up a client regime in Afghanistan. 145 Nor do I believe that
143. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1979, at Al, col. 6. See, e.g., Lewis, Intermedate Range Nu.
clear Weapons, Sci. AM., Dec., 1980, at 63-73.
144. Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 29, 1972, reprinted
in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 756 (1972).
145. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1981, at A4, col. 4.
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the Soviet march into Afghanistan was just another step along the road
of some master plan for world conquest. As is characteristic of both
superpowers, the Soviets exploited an opportunity created by the inep-
titude of American policymakers who lost control of international
political conditions. If there had been no "racetrack" MX decision, no
Soviet brigade crisis, no new theater nuclear weapons announced for
Europe, no threatening U.S. military relationship with China, no Ira-
nian hostage crisis and buildup of U.S. military forces in the Arabian
Gulf and Indian Ocean, if SALT II had been ratified and preparations
were underway for the SALT III negotiations, if dktente was still alive
and flourishing-or even if all these disturbing events had not been
occurring concurrently-there is a good chance the Soviets would have
refrained from an invasion and instead have contented themselves with
maintaining previous levels of military support provided to the Marxist
government in Afghanistan.
The key analytical question, therefore, is not why the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan. From their perspective, there were several sound strategic
reasons for doing so. Rather, the inquiry should be why the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan when they did at the end of December, 1979. I
submit that the correct answer lies in the Carter administration's mis-
management of this series of severe international crises. These predica-
ments resulted in part because of its insensitivity to the requirements of
international law and to the potential usefulness of international orga-
nizations for the peaceful settlement of disputes.146
This argument is not intended to excuse or condone the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, but simply to illuminate some of the motivations
that may have induced such drastic Soviet action. There is no point in
debating the "real" motivations behind the Afghanistan invasion be-
cause most probably they will never be known. Whatever they might
have been, this aggression has created a new geopolitical status quo in
Southwest Asia that must be dealt with on its own terms by the United
States government. The Soviet threat to Iran and Pakistan is incontest-
ably real, and beyond them lie the Persian Gulf mini-states, Saudi Ara-
bia, and the Indian subcontinent. Yet throughout the Iranian crisis the
Carter administration lost sight of the true U.S. national security inter-
ests at stake in this region: to keep the Soviet Union at a safe distance
from the Persian Gulf oil lifeline to Western Europe and Japan. In-
146. See, ag., Rubin, Guarding the Gulf, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 7, 1980, at 23, col.
1; Rubin, The Hostages: International Law to the Rescue?, id, Jan. 9, 1981, at 22, col. 4;
Falk, Comments on International Law and the United States'Response to the Iranian Revolu-
tion, 33 RuTGERs L. Rnv. 399 (1981).
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stead, for domestic political purposes, it chose counterproductively to
concentrate on the hostage situation.
Several elements of the Carter administration's reaction to the Af-
ghanistan invasion are best explained by its desire to be re-elected: the
predictably porous grain embargo,147 curtailment of Soviet fishing
rights,148 suspension of Soviet contracts and a freeze on sophisticated
technology transfers, 149 boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, 50 an
ineffective draft registration,151 the $400 million in "peanuts" for Paki-
stan,' 52 Brzezinski's near fatal visit to the Khyber Pass, 153 Mohammed
Ali's embarrassing pep talks in African capitals, 154 and Clark Clifford's
war scare.' 55 This assortment of uncoordinated half-measures
amounted to tough-talking, but not a foreign policy. It accomplished
little more than electoral grandstanding. Each action was a one-shot
affair incapable of exerting a compelling military, political, or eco-
nomic impact upon the Soviet Union. Together they were based on the
erroneous belief that the Soviet government would disgorge a signifi-
cant geopolitical gain because of inconsequential economic and moral
pressures brought to bear by a group of diplomatic amateurs fighting
for their electoral lives. None was effectively designed to redress the
geopolitical situation produced by the Afghanistan invasion. The
Carter administration was too preoccupied pursuing its "honor" in Iran
to focus the necessary attention and resources on the really serious cri-
sis in Afghanistan.
President Carter claimed to deal directly with the Afghanistan inva-
sion when he announced his Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. By this
statement, he committed the United States government to use military
force to prevent "any outside force [i.e., the Soviet Union] to gain con-
trol of the Persian Gulf region."' 156 Even if supported by a credible
147. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1980, at 39, col. 1; Id, June 2, 1980, at 34, col. 6; id,
July 14, 1980, at 24, col. 6 (embargo was a failure).




151. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1981).
152. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
153. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at A6, col. 4.
154. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1980, at 3, col. 1; id, Feb. 4, 1980, at AI0, col. I; id, Feb. 5,
1980, at A14, col. 1; id, Feb. 9, 1980, at 3, coL 4.
155. Id, Feb. 3, 1980, at 13, col. 1.
156. State ofthe Union Address, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb., 1980, at A(Special), at B. ("An
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as
an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be
repelled by any means necessary, including military force."). See Wolfe, The Many Doe-
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Rapid Deployment Force (R.D.F.), 157 the Carter Doctrine is a danger-
ous bluff with great potential for nuclear confrontation and escalation.
A Pentagon report has concluded that the United States alone cannot
successfully defend Iranian oil fields from Soviet invasion unless, per-
haps, by resort to the first-use of tactical nuclear weapons.' 58 Their
deployment in a conventional conflict could easily escalate into strate-
gic nuclear warfare between the two superpowers. Similarly, intima-
tions by the Reagan administration of its readiness to counter a Soviet
thrust into Iran with an invasion of Cuba risk the same result. 59
Neither the R.D.F. in the Gulf nor the Soviet "combat brigade" in
Cuba are designed to be effective against the overwhelming superiority
of conventional forces deployed by the other superpower near its heart-
land. But in the Machiavellian calculus of power politics, American
R.D.F. troops are deemed expendable because only the prospect of
their certain death can deter by serving as a nuclear trip-wire. 60 Yet
just because the Soviets have adopted this imprudent approach to pro-
tect Cuba is no reason for the United States to construct a similar trip-
wire for the Persian Gulf. Cuba and the Persian Gulf are not analo-
gous. The requirements for successful deterrence in these respective
regions are so fundamentally dissimilar that they require different for-
eign policies by the two superpowers.
In the near future the primary threat of organized disruption to Gulf
oil production emanates from opposition movements indigenous to the
region. Such disruptions are beyond the capacity of the R.D.F. to
counteract. At the same time, the United States government must not
be tempted to enter into defacto alliances with feudal or reactionary
regimes in order to guarantee their continued survival against internal
adversaries in return for stable supplies of expensive oil. As demon-
strated by the Iranian revolution, even a radical successor regime will
recognize the need to sell oil to Western Europe, Japan, and the United
States for the hard currency necessary to finance basic imports and to
pay for economic development programs. Because the Carter Doctrine
can neither deter the Soviets, nor prevent revolutionary change in the
trines of Carter, 231 NATION 1 (1980). But cf. Goldman, Is There a Russian Energy Crisis?,
ATLANTIC, Sept., 1980, at 55 (No.1).
157. See Koehl & Glick, The Rapid Deployment Farce, AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Jan.,
1981, at 18-21; Bates, The Rapid Deployment Force: Fact or Fiction, J. ROYAL UNITED SERV.
INST., June, 1981, at 23; Record, The RDF Is the Pentagon Kidding?, WASH. Q., Summer,
1981, at 41.
158. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
159. See, e.g., Wash. Post, July 17, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
160. See Anderson, RD.F Predicted to Have High Casualty Rate, Wash. Post, Aug. 7,
1981, at C15, col. 4; id, Oct. 28, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
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Gulf, the Reagan administration should consign it to Trotsky's
"dustbin" of history. Nevertheless, somewhat paradoxically, the Rea-
gan administration has embraced this ill-conceived, rhetorical flourish
by a former opponent, uttered during the heat of an unsuccessful elec-
tion campaign, 161 as the cornerstone of its policy towards the Persian
Gulf. Now the Reagan Corollary has improvidently extended the
Carter Doctrine to ordain U.S. opposition to internally-based interfer-
ence with the free flow of Saudi Arabian oil.162
Likewise, it was unwise for the Carter administration and, later, the
Reagan administration, to offer economic and military assistance to the
governments of President Siad Barre in Somalia and of King Hassan II
in Morocco for the purpose of securing U.S. access rights to these coun-
tries incident to intervention by the R.D.F. in the Persian Gulf region.
President Barre uses American support to continue his covert war
against Ethiopia in the Ogaden, thus perpetuating the presence of Cu-
ban troops and Soviet advisers in the Horn of Africa. King Hassan
employs American weapons to consolidate his unjustified hold over the
Western Sahara, thus further destabilizing relations in Northern Africa
between Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. Both of
these policies expressly violate some of the most fundamental norms of
the contemporary international legal order concerning the prohibition
on transnational violence, the inviolability of international borders, the
right to self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of international
disputes. The United States should, therefore, dissociate itself from
either regime for any purpose other than using its influence to facilitate
negotiated solutions to the Saharan and Ogaden conflicts under the
auspices of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations.
IV. Persian Gulf Security
Nuclear war over events in the Gulf was more likely than is gener-
ally believed. The report by columnist Jack Anderson that the Carter
administration was contemplating for electoral purposes an invasion of
Iran in the fall of 1980 coincided with a substantial increase in U.S.
forces stationed in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf.163 Anderson's
allegations warrant a full-scale congressional investigation. This is un-
161. See Newsom, America Engulfed, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer, 1981, at 17.
162. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Safire, The Reagan Corollary, id, Oct. 4,
1981, § E, at 21, col. 5.
163. Champaign-Urbana News Gazette, Aug. 18, 1980, at A4, col. 4; Id, Aug. 19, 1980,
at A4, col. 6; id, Aug. 20, 1980, at A4, col. 4; id, Aug. 21, 1980, at A4, col. 1; id, Aug. 22,
1980, at A4, col. 4; Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1980, at D13, col. 3; Wash. Star, Sept. 21, 1980, at 6;
Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1981, at B17.
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likely, however, by a Congress willing to accept the Reagan administra-
tion's tendentious assertions that the War Powers Act does not restrict
the deployment of U.S. military advisers in El Salvador and of combat
troops in Lebanon.164 There are also several indications from the pub-
lic record 165 that the Carter administration tacitly condoned, if not ac-
tively encouraged, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September, 1980,
because of the shortsighted belief that the pressures of belligerency
might expedite release of the hostages. Presumably the Iraqi army
could render Iranian oil fields inoperable, and, unlike American
marines, do so without provoking the Soviet Union to exercise its al-
leged right of intervention under Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Russo-
Persian Treaty of Friendship. 66 These Articles were unilaterally abro-
gated by Iran on November 5, 1979, the day after the American diplo-
mats were seized in Teheran. 167 At the time, the Soviet government
protested the Iranian abrogation and, in the aftermath of the Anderson
articles ten months later, raised the specter of counterintervention to
ward off an American invasion.
American efforts to punish, isolate, and weaken the Khomeini re-
gime because of the hostage crisis paved the way for Iraq to invade Iran
in September, 1980.168 The American policy of neutrality towards the
Iran-Iraq war, first announced by the Carter administration, misrepre-
sented fact if not the law.169 A substantial body of opinion believes that
the American government has consistently "tilted" in favor of Iraq de-
spite its public proclamation of neutrality.170 Even if the United States
164. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GIST: U.S. ASSISTANCE TO EL
SALVADOR (May, 1981). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR, SPECIAL REPORT No. 80 (Feb. 23, 1981).
165. Whose Interest?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1980, at 42; Mansur (pseud.), The Military
Balance in the Persian Gulf Who Will Guard the Gulf Statesfrom Their Guardians?, ARMED
FORCES J. INT'L, Nov. 1980, at 44; Dangerous Game, 231 NATION 395 (1980) (editorial) (U.S.
AWACS in Saudi Arabia reportedly supply Iraq with military intelligence); Who Will Police
These Shores?, MIDDLE EAST, Oct., 1980, at 26, col. 1, at col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1981, at
10, col. 1.
166. Treaty of Friendship, Feb. 26, 1921, R.S.F.S.R.-Persia, 9 L.N.T.S. 383.
167. See Reisman, Termination of the USSR's Treaty Right of Intervention in Iran, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 145 (1980). See also Hirschfeld, Moscow andKhomein" Soviet-Iranian
Relations in Historical Perspective, ORBIs, Summer, 1980, at 219.
168. See generally Hardcastle, The Shatt-al-Arab Saga, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1980, at
11; Too Hot to Handle, MIDDLE EAST, Nov., 1980, at 10; N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1980, at A8,
col. 1. On the emerging role of Iraq as a Gulf power, see Wright, Implications of the Iraq-
Iran War, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 275 (1980); Dawisha, Iraq: The Wests Ofportunity, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Winter, 1980-81, at 134; Kedourie, The Illusions of Powerlessness, NEW REPUBLIC,
Nov. 29, 1980, at 17.
169. Iran-Iraq Conflict, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov., 1980, 53, at 53-54 (statement of President
Carter).
170. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 1981, at C31, col. 3 (C.I.A. will use Egypt and Tur-
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has been factually as well as legally neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, that
position is itself shocking under principles of international law. When
has the United States been neutral in the post-U.N.-Charter world in
the face of outright aggression? As the United States government
should have learned from the tragic history of American neutrality dur-
ing the 1930s, peace is indivisible. In the nuclear age, aggression is the
most dangerous threat to world peace. The United States cannot possi-
bly be consistent in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
without likewise condemning the Iraqi invasion of Iran. With the hos-
tage crisis now behind it, the Reagan administration should abandon
neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war.
The United States, its NATO allies, and Japan possess vital national
security interests in preventing the disintegration of Iran due to fac-
tional strife, secessionist movements, or external aggression or subver-
sion originating from Iraq or the Soviet Union. Continued
destabilization of Iran only generates further opportunities for Soviet
penetration and exploitation. The United States must not permit the
development of a permanent threat to Saudi Arabia and to the free
flow of Gulf oil through the Strait of Hormuz by encouraging condi-
tions that might lead to the installation of an Iranian regime acting at
the behest of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it is necessary to reiterate
that the Iranian people possess the exclusive right to determine their
own form of government without overt or covert U.S. intervention,
even if this means the continuation of an Islamic fundamentalist re-
gime in Teheran.
Under these circumstances the most prudent course for the Reagan
administration is to work towards the establishment of a strong and
stable government in Teheran, able to repel the Iraqi invasion and to
undertake the military measures necessary to offset Soviet divisions
massed on Iran's borders. Of course, improved American relations
with Iraq are a desirable objective as well, but must not be purchased
by derogation from the fundamental principle of international law re-
quiring the condemnation of aggression or by abandoning Iran to the
Soviet Union. Indeed, if the Reagan administration believes that the
major U.S. strategic objective in the Persian Gulf is to counteract a
Soviet thrust through Iran towards Saudi Arabia, the best American
defense can be mounted, not from the borders of Iraq, but from the
eastern and northern frontiers of Iran, at the request of the Iranian gov-
key to mount covert operations against Khomeini); N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
See also MIDDLE EAST, Aug., 1980, at 24.
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emnment and with the assistance of the Iranian army. In this context, a
credible Rapid Deployment Force could play an effective role in ac-
cordance with the requirements of international law. Such action
would be consistent with the right of collective self-defense recognized
by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
To assure that the R.D.F. would be used lawfully, Congress should
amend the War Powers Act171 to provide that the President of the
United States cannot order the introduction of R.D.F. troops into hos-
tilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances without prior authorization by a
joint resolution of Congress. A narrowly drawn exception to this
amendment could permit the President to use R.D.F. troops solely for
the purpose of rescuing or evacuating a substantial number of Ameri-
can citizens from situations where they face imminent danger of death
without the need for prior congressional authorization, though subject
to the other requirements of the Act. Otherwise an American president
will constantly be tempted to deploy the R.D.F. simply because an ef-
fective U.S. interventionary force exists and is subject to his discretion-
ary command.
In order to protect American national interests and the international
order in the Persian Gulf, the Reagan administration should restore
normal diplomatic relations with Iran as soon as possible and without
conditions. The American government must officially label Iraq as the
aggressor in the Gulf war and publicly call for an immediate ceasefire.
The Reagan administration must attempt to convince its NATO allies
to terminate their provision of military weapons and supplies to Iraq. 172
Operating in conjunction with them and Iran, the United States should
seek the United Nations' adoption of some program of deploying a
transitional U.N. peace-keeping force along the Iran-Iraq border, re-
placing withdrawing national troops. 173 The dispute between Iraq and
Iran over the Shatt-al-Arab estuary should be submitted to the proce-
dures for compulsory arbitration set forth in Article 6 of the 1975 Iran-
Iraq Treaty on International Borders and Good Neighborly Rela-
171. War Powers Act of 1973, P.L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
172. See Wohstetter, Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf, SURVEY, Spring, 1980, at
109; Another Offensive and More Blood?, ECONOMIST, May 9, 1981, at 34; Wall St. J., Mar. 5,
1982, at 22, col. 1.
173. Thus this author approves of the Reagan administration's decision to adhere to the
terms of the Declarations of Algiers as well as of Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972
(1981), for reasons explained elsewhere. See Boyle, 1 & 2 Chicago Daily L. Bull., Feb. 12 &
13, 1981, at 1 & 1. See also Perlmutter, American Policy in the Middle East: New Approach
for a New Administration, PARAMETERS, June, 1981, at 14; Perlmutter, Supporting Our Vital
Interests in Iran, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1981, at 14, col. 3.
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
tions. 174 Although insufficient to justify a counter-invasion of Iraq, Ira-
nian demands for the payment of reparations and for the deposition of
President Hussein are reasonable and supportable under principles of
international law. These Iranian concerns should be recognized and
accommodated to some extent within the framework ultimately
adopted for the peaceful settlement of this dispute by the U.N. Security
Council.
The criticism that such a dramatic reversal of American policy in the
Gulf would alienate such friendly regimes as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
and Jordan overlooks the fact that American neutrality in this war has
simply encouraged these Arab countries temporarily to put aside their
animosities in aligning themselves with Iraq against non-Arab Iran.
Restoring peace to the Persian Gulf demands American leadership act-
ing in strict accordance with the rules of international law and in full
cooperation with the relevant international organizations.
Despite the foregoing criticisms of the Carter administration's han-
dling of the Iranian hostage crisis, the United States demonstrated re-
straint by abstaining from the use of potentially overwhelming military
force to terminate the incident. This example stands in stark contrast
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its long-standing threat of
military intervention in Poland. In the wake of the Afghanistan inva-
sion there has been a fundamental realignment of political relations
among the nations of Southwest Asia, acting in fearful response to the
Soviet threat. 175 By its forebearance in Iran, the United States has cre-
ated an opportunity to work with the states of this area to create indi-
vidual and collective self-defense arrangements to prevent conditions
inviting additional Soviet or intra-regional aggression.
In this regard, the purveyance of sophisticated American weapons
systems and technology to the states of Southwest Asia (e.g., Saudi
Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, China) is an important issue. As
events in Iran demonstrated, arms sales can become counterproductive.
Any U.S. arms transfer viust be required by the legitimate defensive
needs of these countries as defined by international law and interpreted
in good faith by the American government. Unilateral policy determi-
nations by these foreign governments do not provide adequate criteria.
Thus the Reagan administration ought not to provide weapons to
Saudi Arabia simply to curry favor and secure a stable flow of oil to the
West, or to China as a geopolitical "card" to be played in some Machi-
174. Treaty on International Borders and Good Neighborly Relations, Iran-Iraq, June
13, 1975, reprinted in 14 IN'L LEGAL MATS. 1133 (1975).
175. India and Pakistan Join in Gui Game, MIDDLE EAST, June, 1981, at 31.
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avellian balancing game of power politics with the Soviet Union. Nor
should such weapons be given to any state that manifests a tendency to
employ them in a manner the United States or the U.N. Security Coun-
cil deems in violation of international law. Thus the Israeli air strikes
with American-made planes against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the
P.L.O. headquarters in Beirut and the threat to bomb Syrian anti-air-
craft missiles in Lebanon during the summer of 1981 and its illegal
invasion of Lebanon, one year later, as well as Pakistan's three wars
with India and pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, should be
grounds for additional concern and re-evaluation by the Reagan ad-
ministration. All these states bear heavy burdens of proof in regard to
pending American arms transfers that have yet to be discharged in a
manner satisfactory to the requirements of international law and U.S.
statutes.176 Unfortunately, the Reagan administration has apparently
chosen to rely on the wholesale provision of American military equip-
ment to various governments around the world, an ineffectual and ulti-
mately self-defeating substitute for performing the hard task of
formulating a set of coherent principles for the conduct of American
foreign policy on some basis other than Machiavellian power politics.
In a long-term perspective on Persian Gulf security, the Reagan ad-
ministration should encourage the efforts of six local states to form a
viable Gulf Cooperation Council. 177 Such an organization could be-
come an effective security organization, affiliated with the United Na-
tions under Chapter 8 of the Charter, possessing a standing
peacekeeping force, or the ability to field one on short notice. Though
the Council aims to keep both superpowers out of the region, a Gulf
security organization could only advance the interests of the U.S., its
NATO allies, and Japan by the establishment of some degree of peace,
order, and stability in this area. Geography gives the Soviet Union
advantages the West cannot match without an active local defense sys-
tem. A Gulf security organization would be far more successful in
peacefully resolving local disputes, opposing intra-regional aggression,
and suppressing externally fomented disturbances than the American
Rapid Deployment Force ever could be. The Reagan administration
should therefore shift the emphasis of its strategic planning in the Gulf
from the creation of a formal anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" under
176. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2314(d), 2753(c) & 2754 (1976).
177. See Together, at Last, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1981, at 37; Guff Security Document,
MIDDLE EAST, Jan., 1981, at 16; No Secrets on Gulf Security, id, Mar., 1981, at 18; Cautiom"
Building in Progress, id, Apr., 1981, at 8; Gu#f Council Shfs into Second Gear, id, Oct.,
1981, at 25; Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1982, at 28, col. 3.
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American leadership, to the foundation of a Gulf regional security or-
ganization in which the United States is not a member and plays no
formal role outside the context of the Article 51 right of collective self-
defense.
Finally, the success of any American foreign policy in the Persian
Gulf cannot be divorced from the issue of peace between Israel and its
neighbors. A necessary precondition to Persian Gulf security is active
American support for progress towards implementing the right to self-
determination for the Palestinian people in accordance with the rules of
international law. 178 Otherwise the primary political objective of Gulf
states will continue to be to organize their efforts and substantial re-
sources in opposition to both Israel and the United States. Conversely,
in this regard the Reagan administration's decision to assign troops
from the 82nd Airborne Division, already designated as part of the
Rapid Deployment Force, to serve as a component unit within the mul-
tinational peacekeeping force that is to police the easternmost section
of the Sinai desert after Israel's withdrawal on April 25, 1982, is short-
sighted. The peace between Egypt and Israel should not be linked in
any way to the prospect of illegal American intervention in the Persian
Gulf.
V. International Law and the Future Conduct of American
Foreign Policy
A. Cuba
The conclusion compelled by this analysis requires that American
foreign policy stand on international law and work with international
organizations to achieve the nation's goals, and cease the illegal threat
or use of force, retaliation, reprisal, retorsion, intervention, and self-
help against its adversaries. Thus, in regard to Cuba, the best way to
"neutralize" Castro as an anti-U.S. actor in international relations ex-
cludes the means hitherto used: military invasion, naval blockade, cov-
ert operations, or measures of economic and political destabilization,
all of which violate international law.179 Rather, the Reagan adminis-
tration should seek to re-establish normal diplomatic relations with the
Castro government; to remove U.S. economic sanctions imposed
against Cuba; to prosecute Cuban refugee groups located in the United
States that prepare armed expeditions against the Castro government in
178. Interview with Abdullah Bishara, Secretary General of the Gulf Co-operation Council,
MIDDLE EAST, Sept., 1981, at 35.
179. See LovIer, Trainingfor the Counterrevolution, 233 NATION 265-68 (1981).
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976), and, under 22 U.S.C. § 461 (1976);
to employ U.S. military forces to thwart such expeditions whenever de-
tected; to reverse the 1962 Punta del Este resolution by the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
American Republics that excluded the Castro government from partici-
pation in the inter-American system; and, finally, to include Cuba
within President Reagan's proposal for an economic development pro-
gram for the Caribbean basin. Such measures would dissolve Cuba's
burdensome, and, at times, counterproductive and unwanted reliance
on the Soviet Union for military defense and financial subsistence.
Such a new Cuban policy would facilitate a peaceful settlement to the
conflict in El Salvador negotiated by all internal parties under the aus-
pices of the Organization of American States, or the United Nations, or
both. In conjunction with a much needed improvement of U.S. rela-
tions with the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, this new Cuban
policy would set the stage for restoring peace and stability in Central
America. There are current indications that the Reagan administration
is supporting military operations against Nicaragua from Honduras;
such actions make for illegal, irresponsible, and counterproductive pol-
icy toward this region. Because of the immediate present danger of
further U.S. military intervention into Central America, Congress
should enact an equivalent of the Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S.
intervention in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa
Rica, Cuba, and Grenada.
U.S. initiation of a rapprochement with Castro could bring such other
tangible benefits as the gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops from An-
gola. This result depends on a renewed and strengthened U.S. commit-
ment to the independence of Namibia along the lines of the plan
approved by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 435 (1978).
Meanwhile, the Reagan administration should establish normal diplo-
matic relations with the M.P.L.A. government in Luanda, obey the
terms of 22 U.S.C. § 2293 note (1976) prohibiting assistance of any
kind for military or paramilitary operations in Angola without explicit
congressional authorization, and participate in the condemnation by
the U.N. Security Council of all South African military raids mounted
from Namibia into Angola. The Reagan administration's concentra-
tion on the Cuban presence in Angola will only link the United States
more closely with the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Reagan
administration's failure actively to support the independence of
Namibia will undermine the good political and economic relationships
with Black African states that were successfully promoted by the Carter
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administration, and will contravene the principles of international law
and resolutions of international organizations concerning Namibia and
South Africa. The right of the Namibian people to self-determination
had been firmly established under international law before the Ameri-
can, South African, and Cuban governments decided to intervene in
the Angolan civil war. Consequently the Reagan administration must
not obstruct the achievement of Namibian independence by condition-
ing it on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
B. SALT
International peace and stability would also be strengthened by a
continuation of the SALT process. The rhetoric of the 1980 presiden-
tial campaign obscured several points about SALT II that are crucial
for the future. Foremost is that SALT II is not an effective arms con-
trol measure. It places no real restrictions on either side, but left both
superpowers essentially free to build all their currently planned weap-
ons systems up to the SALT II limits. 80 The Soviets agreed to disman-
tle obsolete weapons systems. Both countries agreed to limit the
number of MIRVs per missile that, in any case, they would not be tech-
nologically able to exceed until after the expiration of SALT II in 1985.
The freeze on the number of Soviet "heavy" SS-18s at 308 did not mat-
ter much because that figure represented their planned deployment of
the missile. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff testified
that the treaty would not impede the U.S. nuclear weapons program to
any significant extent.' 8' Therefore, the Carter administration's con-
stant refrain that all SALT II restrictions applied to the Soviet Union,
and none to the United States, 182 was misleading. Likewise, charges by
groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger (C.P.D.) 8 3 and,
later, under its influence, by candidate Reagan, that SALT II under-
mined the foundations of Western strategic nuclear deterrence were
unfounded. 84 Yet, because the C.P.D.'s strategic nuclear assumption
(e.g., the "window of vulnerability") dominate the defense and foreign
180. See Reagan Strategic Arms Policy: No Big Surprises Seen Soon, 39 CONG. Q. 177
(1981).
181. Senate Testimony of General Brown on SALTII, in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CURRENT POLICY No. 72A, at 33, 35-36 (July 9-11, 1979). See also
Senate Testimony of Secretary Brown on SALT II, in id at 9, 15.
182. See, e.g., Warnke, Remarks, 74 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 212, 213 (1980).
183. Rostow, The Case Against SALT II, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1979, at 23; Rostow,
SALT II: A SOFT BARGAIN, A HARD SELL (Committee on the Present Danger, 1978).
184. See, e.g., Lens, A-bomb Almanac, 232 NATION 389 (1981); Metcalf, Missile Accu-
racy-The Need to Know, STRATEGIC REVIEW, Summer, 1981, at 5; Wicker, Rethinking the
MX(2), N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1981, at 23, col. 5.
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policies of the Reagan administration, they must be seriously re-ex-
amined and ultimately repudiated. The C.P.D.'s unwarranted assump-
tions do not justify the enormous conventional and nuclear weapons
buildup currently proposed by the Reagan administration which, it ad-
mits, will be financed directly by cuts from scarce resources previously
allocated to social welfare programs and human services. This wasteful
and unnecessary arms buildup constitutes a greater present danger to
the peace, stability, security, and prosperity of the United States at
home and abroad.
SALT II possessed little more than symbolic significance without
SALT III. Yet the great value of SALT II was that it could have paved
the way for successful SALT III negotiations concerning theater nu-
clear forces in Europe and for genuine arms reduction agreements be-
tween the two nuclear superpowers and their allies in the future. An
indefinite extension of SALT II beyond 1985 could help forestall the
development of any "window of vulnerability" for both Soviet and
U.S. ICBM systems.
The intrinsic value of SALT lies less in the numerical limitations and
procedural requirements formally set forth in each treaty, than in the
process of negotiation itself. The technology of mass destruction devel-
ops too rapidly for cumbersome, time-consuming, and highly
politicized treaty negotiation and ratification procedures to control.
The SALT process cannot stop the arms race until it can first control
the technology race. In the meantime, however, the uninterrupted con-
tinuation of the SALT process serves the purpose of attempting to regu-
late technological evolution in the nuclear arms race. SALT makes the
arms race appear more understandable, predictable, less irrational, and
thus more susceptible to governmental control. Undoubtedly these ap-
pearances are dangerous. But nuclear deterrence is essentially a psy-
chological phenomenon. In the absence of genuine arms reductions
these illusions render the strategic balance of terror between the two
nuclear superpowers more stable and thus less dangerous than would
be the cise without them.
On assuming office, the Reagan administration immediately should
have begun formal negotiations with the Soviet Union over the "mod-
ernization" of theater nuclear weapons in Europe: SS-20s, the Pershing
2, ground-launched cruise missiles, the neutron bomb, and the Backfire
bomber, inter alia. Furthermore, the Reagan administration should
have called for an immediate opening of formal negotiations concern-
ing strategic systems not prohibited by SALT II: the new, "light"
ICBM, cruise missiles, high energy, anti-satellite, and space-based
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weapons, and so on. This post-SALT II stage of the nuclear arms race
has already begun. The two superpowers, in conjunction with their al-
lies, must negotiate immediately and comprehensively to prevent the
loss of control over the development of these new and destabilizing
weapons systems. Regrettably, the Reagan administration has wasted
precious time debating whether even to participate in SALT III and
START negotiations with the Soviet Union.
In the immediate future the Reagan administration should officially
disavow Presidential Directive 59, another Carter campaign fiasco, that
naively contemplates the possibility of fighting a limited nuclear war as
well as Secretary Weinberger's plan for "protracted" nuclear war. 185
The Reagan administration, moreover, should not deploy any land-
based MX or Pershing 2 systems or sea-based Trident II system that
possesses a first-strike capability against the Soviet ICBM force. Like-
wise, Pentagon proposals to defend a multibillion dollar land-based
MX with a multibillion dollar anti-ballistic missile system would com-
pound one tragic mistake with another. 186 Therefore, the 1972 U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty must not be abrogated
when it is reviewed in 1982 or 1987.187 The Reagan administration
should work assiduously toward conclusion of the partially completed
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 188 Finally, the United States should
continue to resist further proliferation of nuclear weapons technology
and materials.
To support movement in this direction, the Reagan administration
must continue to adhere to the terms of the unratified SALT II Treaty.
Ultimately, American ratification of SALT II or of some cosmetic sub-
stitute will prove to be the precondition for further progress in reaching
strategic nuclear arms control and reduction agreements with the So-
viet Union. START I can only succeed within the context of a ratified
185. See Warnke & Schneider, 4 Nuclear War Must Never be Fought, ACROSS THE
BOARD, Mar., 1981, at 14; Commandand Control- Use It or Lose It?, F.A.S. PUB. INTEREST
REPORT, Oct., 1980, at 1; Boyle, Book Review, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 402 (1981); Nunn, Termina-
tion" The Myth of the Short, Decisive Nuclear War, PARAMETERS, Dec., 1980, at 36. Com-
pare Beres, PresidentialDirective 59: A.CriticalAssessment, PARAMETERS, Mar., 1981, at 19,
with Gray, Presidential Directive 59: Flawed But Use/ul, id at 28, and Howard, On Fighting
a Nuclear War, INT'L SECURITY, Spring, 1981, at 3, with Slocombe, The Countervailing Strat-
egy, id at 19, and Trofimenko, Counteaforce. Illusion of a Panacea, id at 29.
186. See Robinson, Layered De/ense System Pushed to Protect ICBMs, AVIATION WEEK
& SPACE TECH., Feb. 9, 1981, at 9; Quirt, Washington's New Pushfor Anti-Missiles, FOR-
TUNE, Oct. 19, 1981, at 142.
187. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435,
T.I.A.S. No. 7503, amended by Protocol of July 3, 1974, 27 U.S.T. 1645, T.I.A.S. No. 8276.
188. See Report on CTB Negotiations, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov., 1980, at 47; Caldwell,
CTB: An Effective SALT Substitute, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Dec., 1980, at 30.
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SALT II. Consequently, the Reagan administration must repudiate its
adoption of Kissinger's theory of "linkage" between considerations of
geopolitical power politics (e.g., Poland, Afghanistan, El Salvador) and
those of nuclear weapons control.18 9 Human survival depends on the
success of these endeavors to control the nuclear arms race. While de-
fective, they represent the only substitutes for the increasing risk of a
nuclear war. There is no alternative. If the treaty ratification proce-
dure in the U.S. Senate proves a major obstacle to the realization of the
foregoing agenda, future administrations must submit arms control
agreements for approval by a joint resolution of Congress. 90 They
must not be held hostage to the self-interested votes of a few Senators.
Obstinacy over a revised SALT II or SALT III or START must not be
permitted to pave the way for World War III.
C. The Strugglefor International Law
The members of the American international legal community have
often assisted the Machiavellian foreign policies of the United States
government by manufacturing legal arguments as ad hoc or ex post
facto justifications for decisions taken on the grounds of power politics.
Their fascination by the possibility of someday wielding governmental
power has seduced American international lawyers into becoming
apologists for its proffigate use, rather than teachers of its proper exer-
cise, in international relations. In the process, both the vital national
security interests of the United States and the strength of international
law and international organizations have grievously suffered. Histori-
cally the cause of neither has been advanced by the subservience of
American international lawyers to the Machiavellian policy pro-
nouncements issued from the White House, the Departments of State
and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
For at least the past twenty years, these American governmental
policymakers have tried to base their foreign policies on Machiavellian
power politics. The result has been a series of disasters for the United
States. They have seriously damaged the integrity of the international
legal order that the United States helped construct at the San Francisco
Conference in 1945. This resulted because Machiavellian power poli-
189. See, e.g., Hamilton, To Link or Not to Link, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Fall, 1981, at 927. See
also Selin, Looking.Ahead to SALTII, INT'L SECURITY, Winter, 1980-81, at 171; Drell &
Wisner, A New Formulafor Nuclear Arms Control, id at 186.
190. See Comment, Approval of SALT Agreements by Joint Resolution of Congress, 21
HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (1980). See also McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Execu-
tive or PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable Instruments ofNational Policy, (pts 1 & 2),
54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945).
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tics contradicts several of the most fundamental normative principles
which the United States should cherish: the inalienable rights of the
individual, self-determination, the sovereign equality and indepen-
dence of states, nonintervention, the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional disputes, and respect for international law and organizations.
Throughout the twentieth century, the promotion of international law
and international organizations traditionally has provided the United
States with the means for reconciling the idealism of American values
and aspirations with the realism of world politics and historical
conditions.191
Practitioners of Machiavellian power politics such as Kissinger,
Brzezinski, and Haig demonstrate little appreciation of, or sensitivity to
the requirements of the U.S. constitutional system of government. The
American people have never been willing to provide sustained popular
support for a foreign policy that has violated the elementary norms of
international law because they have habitually perceived themselves to
constitute a democratic political society governed by an indispensable
commitment to the rule of law in all sectors of their national endeavors.
The U.S. government's resolute dedication to the pursuit of interna-
tional law in foreign affairs has proved to be critical both for the preser-
vation of America's internal equilibrium and for the protection of
America's global position.
By contrast, according to The Prince, the practice of Machiavellian-
ism abroad requires the practice of Machiavellianism at home. Ameri-
can foreign policymakers cannot realistically expect to exercise
Machiavellian power politics in international relations without exper-
iencing its intrusion into domestic affairs. The Nixon-Kissinger admin-
istration is an outstanding example of this proposition. Painfully aware
of this interconnection, the American people cannot tolerate, but in-
stead ultimately will resist the practice of Machiavellian power politics
by their government when it becomes obvious. Thus, despite the
Machiavellian predilections held by international political scientists of
the "realist" school, it is the unalterable nature of this "legalist" reality
so intrinsic to the United States that must be understood, internalized,
and effectuated by its foreign policymakers. The harmful thesis pro-
pounded by international political scientists that, for some mysterious
reason, a democracy is inherently incapable of developing a coherent
and consistent foreign policy without Machiavellianism simply reflects
191. See Boyle, American Foreign Policy Towards International Law and Organizations:
1898-1917 (forthcoming).
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their refusal to accept the well-established primacy of law over power
in the American constitutional system of government.
The present danger is power politics. The only antidote is interna-
tional law. The choice is stark, ominous, and compelling. Interna-
tional lawyers, therefore, must organize themselves into the vanguard
of a struggle against the current domination of the American foreign
policy establishment by the Machiavellians. The U.N. Charter must be
restored as the underlying premise of American policy. Otherwise nu-
clear catastrophe envisioned most recently by such pragmatic and ex-
perienced leaders as Hans Morgenthau, George Kistiakowski, George
Kennan, and Hyman Rickover, will be inevitable.
October 8, 1982
